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ADJUSTING THE CONFLICTING INTERESTS
OF LANDOWNER AND AVIATOR IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
EDWARD C. SWEENEY*

I. THE PROBLEM
Aviation has developed to a point where it now assumes a
considerable economic, social and military importance. But, in
establishing itself, it has given rise to important legal problems
associated with the conflicting interests of landowner and aviator.
The question is no longer: shall the aviator be permitted to fly
above the land of another, but is, instead: how shall flying activities be conducted so as to be least harmful, if harmful at all, to
the owner of the land.
At the outset, it is necessary to state and clarify the problems
involved in this conflict of interest. While the settlement of the
various questions concerned with trespass, nuisance, liability, etc.,
can be settled only by the courts, still, it is important that there
be a clear understanding of the interests involved and the extent
to which they should be protected. An explanation of the different situations in which the aviator's and the landowner's interests
come into conflict shows the variety in, and the complexity of, the
problems confronting the courts. Every situation involves distinct
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demands of each party and must be treated separately by the courts
if a socially desirable compromise is to be reached. The individual
situations may be grouped into the following five classes: (1)
flights of aircraft over private property, apart from taking-off and
landing; (2) flights of aircraft in taking-off and landing; (3) operation of an airport apart from flying; (4) contact made by an
aircraft or its contents with the tangible property of the landowner; and (5) obstructions to aviation caused by the erection
of structures or obstructions caused by other activities of the landowner. The first four classes involve interference by aviation with
the use and enjoyment of the land surface. The last involves
the reverse, namely, the interference of the landowner with aviation. An examination of each of these classes, free from legal
verbiage and the technical issues raised, reveals a variety of specific clashes of interest. Suggestions upon the proper manner of
dealing with these conflicts will be offered in the final division of
this paper.
(1)

Flight of Aircraft Apart from Taking-off and Landing.

Airways have been established between the important cities of
the country and practically all commercial air travel takes place
over these airways. Theoretically, an airway is a direct line between two cities, but in practice is more like an ocean ship route
than a land highway. However, by the aid of federal air beacons,
markers, compasses, and radio-direction-indicators 1 aircraft are
able to follow relatively definite lanes and thus fly repeatedly over
the same land. The redress afforded landowners located below
commercial airways should be greater than that afforded other
landowners whose use and enjoyment is only intermittently disturbed by the flight of a cross-country flyer or the aircraft which
2
occasionally wanders off an established airway.
1. General Airway Information, Airway Bulletin No. 1, Sept. 1, 1931
(Washington, Gov. Printing Office, 1931), Radio Aids to Air Navigation,
pp. 69-80. For a description of the Aural and Visual type of radio range
beacon systems, see pages 70 and 73.
2. A writer in 1910 vividly describes the annoyances that repeated
flights may create: "Such machines are now very few in number, and are
quite welcome to go where their owners will, but in time they may become
numerous and develop unsuspected dangers. One a year flying over a
man's house might be a negligible menace, but forty or fifty a day, with
ropes dangling, ballast falling, anchors hanging, motors in danger of exploding, and the whole machine liable to drop and set fire to or smash
crops or dwellings,-would be an entirely different matter." "Law of the
Air; Should the Rights of Aviation Be Defined by Statute," 16 Case and
Com. 216 (1910).
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If the flight of aircraft causes disturbance to a landowner, the
degree of disturbance will vary materially according to the particular use to which the land is put. It is well known by aviators
that certain domestic animals are more easily frightened than others
by low-flying aircraft. While an aircraft flying at 500 feet might
cause no disturbances at all to grazing cattle or to horses,3 it might
seriously interfere with the conduct of a chicken ranch or fox
farm. Several instances of injury to animals caused by the normal
flight of airplanes have been reported.
"I am a poultry raiser keeping about 2,500 Leghorns", wrote the
proprietor of the Cackle Corner Poultry Farm at Garrettsville, Ohio, to the
Postmaster General. "About once in two or three weeks an airplane, sometimes it is a U. S. mail plane, flies over my place so low that the hens
become so frightened that they pile up, thus injuring each other and my
egg yield drops one or two hundred eggs per day, and by the time I get them
back to normal along comes another low flying machine and sends my egg
yield down again. I dare say a small flock would not be harmed as much
as the larger flocks, but the loss to me is so great that I fear it may put
me out of business and I wondered if the planes could not be requested
to fly higher." In this instance the Postmaster General requested the
National Air Transport, Inc., operating the United States mail planes between New York and Chicago, to order its pilots to ascend a little higher
4
when they reached Garrettsville.
3. "A plane landing in a field near Wrexhamb, Devonshire, frightened
a black horse and it bolted with fright. Four days later its mane had
turned pure white and there were streaks of gray in its tail." I. N. S.,
London, May 9, 1932. The Aeronautical News for May 30, 1932 reports
this incident and states that the place was Denhighshire, England, and that
the horse belonged to Sir Alfred McAlpine.
4. Postoffice Dept. Press Release, Domestic Air News, Jan. 31, 1928,
cited in lorne, "Property in the Air as Affected by the Airplane and Radio,"
4 Jour. Land & Publ. Util. 257, 265 (1928), 62 Am. L. Rev. 887 (1928).
In Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D.
Ohio 1929), the flight of a Goodyear blimp, while flying over plaintiff's
farm at an altitude between 150 and 200 feet caused the plaintiff's team of
horses to run away with the wagon which he was loading and physically
injure the plaintiff. Demurrer was overruled and presumably the airship
company compensated the plaintiff for his injury.
"An Iowa man last year filed a claim against the Government because
U. S. airplane No. 1646 caused his horses to run away, with resulting
damage." Woodhouse, "Who Dropped the Monkey Wrench on your Head?"
9 Flying 38, 40 (1920).
In Glatt v. Page (Dist. Ct., 3d Jud. Dist. of Neb., Docket 93-115, 1928),
the plaintiff alleged that airplanes disturbed his livestock and prevented his
poultry from laying. The District Court granted an injunction and gave
nominal damages. Possibly livestock will eventually become accustomed to
airplanes, in the same manner in which they have become accustomed to
the automobile.
"There was a farmer near Kansas City who obtained an injunction
against an aeroplane company, restricting it from flying aeroplanes over his
land." Woodhouse, supra, p. 38.
"When horses on the farm of Mr. C. C. Wedding were being fed they
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"A fox farm has been damaged last year in excess of $100,000," stated
the Director of Aeronautics of Ohio in his annual report for 1929, "because
of the circling of airplanes low over the fox farm. The female foxes
which are highly excitable at all times in their efforts to protect their pups
from the supposed danger either smothered them or choked them to death
in carrying them too far by the neck."b

Numerous instances may be mentioned where the special use
of land may make the ordinary flights of aircraft a peculiar annoyance. A hospital or sanitarium is best located where it is free
from disturbing noises. The same applies to schools of all kinds,6
also to land used for decoying water-fowl. Country estates are
usually located in secluded spots to secure privacy and freedom
from city noises and the operation of a commercial airway overhead
can easily defeat this purpose. It is reported that certain
country estates north of Chicago which are situated within several
were frightened by an aeroplane which flew low over the property. They
had not recovered from their fright when placed in the reaper-thresher, and
bolted. The machine, which cost 1200 recently, was badly damaged, Mr.
Wedding injured his leg, and his horses received cuts." Incident at Owen,
South Africa; 2 Wings 29 (Australia, 1932).
"In England, a member of the Royal Flying Corps was arrested and
sentenced to be discharged from the service for flying at a low altitude,
thereby damaging telegraph wires and endangering the public. The sentence
was commuted to twenty-eight days' detention and loss of two months'
pay." Woodhouse, supra, p. 39.
In Bertrand, Brinquant, Mauge, c. Sti Farman, 3 Rev. Jurid. de la
Locomotion Airienne 282 (1912), the "Civil Tribunal of the Seine has held
that aeroplanes flying from defendant's aerodrome over plaintiff's land at
a height of from five to fifteen meters, frightening domestic animals and
game, attracting spectators, and thus injuring crops and generally inconveniencing the plaintiff, render the defendant liable to a judgment for
damages." Zollmann, Law of the Air (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1927),
p. 26; Valentine, "Aerial Trespass," 24 Jurid. Rev. 321 (1913).
5. Tuttle and Bennett, "Extent of Power of Congress over Aviation,"
5 U. of Cinc. L. Rev. 261, 262 (1931).
6. "In Trenton, New Jersey, the Board of Education of Wayne Township has sought to enjoin the construction of an airport near one of
the public schools. The claims made in the complaint are: the establishment
of the airport will involve the flying of the aircraft over the school grounds
at low altitudes and the presence of aircraft will distract the faculty and
the pupils, so that the business of education will be interfered with."
Wenneman, Municipal Airports (Cleveland:
Flying Rev. Pub. Co., 1931)
p. 277.
"It appears that in England the Roedean School, Ltd., has sought an
injunction to restrain the Cornwall Aviation Co., Ltd., from flying or
permitting the flight of aircraft over or near plaintiff's school so as to
constitute a nuisance to plaintiff, its teachers, and pupils." Times, July 3,
1926, cited in Zollmann, Law of the Air, p. 28.
Woodhouse reports an unusual complaint: "The pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Cranbury, New Jersey, caused the arrest of an aviator
on the charge of flying near the church on Sundays, disturbing the services
and keeping people away. It seems that many persons stayed outside to
watch the aeroplane instead of joining the congregation inside, according to
their usual custom." Woodhouse, supra, p. 40.
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miles of the airways between Chicago and Milwaukee, and Chicago
and Madison, have become less desirable and have decreased in
value due to the airway. 7 City dwellers also have at times complained of aircraft flying over their property.8 Low flying is annoying and of great potential danger when over large crowds of
people, such as over football games 9 and races. 10
7. Lecture of Gen. MacChesney at The Summer Institute of The Air
Law Institute, 1930.
In speaking before the American Bar Association in 1931, Gen. MacChesney criticized the Smith case for substantially holding "that the people
who owned this country estate in question had bred themselves into a state
of highly nervous organization whereby noises affected them that did not
affect the ordinary man, so that the flight of these airplanes in landing
and in flying and taking off from it annoyed them 'although the noise
was no greater than that of the ordinary truck upon a city street.'" General
MacChesney then said: "Now I submit to you that in the first place the
man who ordinarily is in position to buy a country estate when he lives
in the city, does not have to put up with the noise of a truck upon a
city street alongside his home, and that the very purpose of acquiring a
country estate or a substantial number of acres, is to get away from the
annoyance of a noise no greater than that of a truck upon the city streets.
The fact of the case is, what gives value to large areas of land in the
country adjacent to our great cities is the opportunity of getting away from
a noise no greater than that of a truck upon the city streets." 56 A. B. A.
Rep. 87 (1931).
In Auto Act. Ges. v. Schr., "Defendant established a flying school and
sent aeroplanes at a low altitude over the plaintiff's adjoining land, making
a great noise. The value of plaintiff's land was so affected by the defendant's actions that on a sale he was able to obtain considerably less for it
than would otherwise have been the case. It was held that he was entitled
to recover the difference." 47 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Neue Folge) 25 (1919), from Zollmann, Law of the Air, p. 27.
8. In Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co. (Dist. Ct., 2d Jud.
Dist. Minn. 1923) the defendant owned property in the city of St. Paul
upon the lawn of which one of defendant's planes crashed. Plaintiff sought
damages and an injunction against all further flying over his premises. The
court followed the Minnesota statute, enjoined all acrobatic flying over
plaintiff's premises and all other flying under 2,000 feet, and presumably
granted the plaintiff compensation for injury to the land from the falling
of the airplane.
"It is currently reported in the press that in a New York village an
injunction is being sought by property owners against the flying of airplanes
over their residence, in which they allege inter alia that last February a
plane fell on their house doing damage to the extent of over $2,000, which
they had to bear, the pilot and his employer being without fault and the
injury being merely one of the inevitable casualties of a form of transportation not yet perfected." The editor of Law Notes informs us that
this arose in Nassau County, probably the village of Hicksville, Mineola
or Hempstead, but that no further action in court was ever reported.
"Aviation or Airport as Nuisance," 34 Law Notes 141 (1930).
9. By the federal air traffic rules, flying over "open-air assemblies
of persons" is required to be above 1,000 feet. Air Commerce Regulations,
Aero. Bull. No. 7, Chap. 7, Sec. 71 (4), in effect Jan. 1, 1932.
10. In Rex v. Henderson (Berks magistrates at Windsor Guildhall,
Aug 6, 1927), the magistrates found that an aviator had been "flying low
to the danger of the public" during the Ascot Heath races, and was dealt
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The type of flying, as well as the kind of craft and number
of motors, will affect the degree of annoyance and the attitude

with which the courts must consider complaints made by landowners. Stunt flying should undoubtedly be placed in a separate
category from ordinary flying because of the increased danger of
accidents.'1 Flying, which is pursued for the express purpose of
annoying persons or animals on the ground, should be separately
considered. 12 In the same category is the type of flying known as
"hedge-hopping," that is, flying so near the ground that it is necessary to zoom upwards to clear the tops of trees and buildings.
Hunting from an airplane may at times disturb the landowner,
especially when he is using his own land for decoying waterfowl
and the like.'18 Sight-seeing excursions over country estates raise
the question of privacy in a particularly forceful manner. Aerial
photography raises the same problem."
By the use of slow-moving airships, blimps, or even autogiros,
with under the Probation of Offenders' Act. The Times, 8th Aug. 1927;
"Dangerous Flying Charge," 91 Justice of Peace 662 (1927).
11. Special restrictions are placed on stunt flying by the federal air
traffic rules. Air Commerce Regulations, Aero. Bull. No. 7, Sec. 72, in
effect Jan. 1, 1932.
In Glatt v. Page, above referred to in note 4,
court enjoined all
"stunt flying and flying in circles above plaintiff's the
house and buildings"
irrespective of altitude.
12. An amusing incident of this type of flying occurred in 1911:
"A fledgling birdman on October 16th last, giving heed to the impulse of
the hour, trundled his aeroplane out of its hangar and mounted skyward.
He gleefully skimmed the neighboring field, circled a building of the Young
Women's Christian Association, just to show off to the occupants, and
looked about for other earthly beings on whom he might make an impression. On he went until finally he found himself over a gentleman's
country estate. Below stretched fields and woodland and the owner's golf
course. On one of the greens he perceived a horse, which was being
employed to cut the grass. What happened next is told by a newspaper of
the day as follows: He 'made the horse a target. He swooped down.

Just before the machine reached the ground the horse looked around. All

horses have been nervous for the last ten years. First the automobile and
then the flying machine contributed to bring about this condition. This
horse had the heart of any other horse. He neighed loudly, leaped into the
air, and fell dead. A veterinarian said afterwards that the horse was
literally scared to death.'" "Liability of the Aviator," 15 Law Notes 169
(1911).
13. But it is to be noted that, in most states, hunting from an aircraft
is prohibited by statute. Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, Sec. 10;
see Fagg, "A Survey of State Aeronautical Legislation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAw 452, 471, note 64 (1930).
14. "In this country the right of privacy is usually well preserved
by one's roof, but in climates where the intimate details of domestic life
are carried on in an open, but privately surrounded, patio or courtyard,
the point is well taken." Logan, Aircraft Law-Made Plain (St. Louis,
1928), 22.
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the craft may hover over property in a manner impossible for the
ordinary airplane which must maintain a relatively high speed
in order to remain in the air. Lighter-than-air craft have so many
characteristics not found in heavier-than-air craft that it may become necessary to treat them independently. The airship might
be safer in that it is not as likely to fall upon the landowner. Its
ability to hover, as above referred to, constitutes a potential annoyance peculiar to the airship and autogiro. The giant rigid airships, such as the "Akron" and "Graf Zeppelin", usually create a
tremendous roar at an altitude at which the ordinary single-motored5
airplane could hardly be an annoyance to those on the ground.1
Industrial flying is rapidly increasing and raises distinct problems. At the present time airplanes are used to dust cotton, spray
fruit trees, plant wheat, prevent the settling of frost, and the like.'8
Each of these operations must be performed at extremely low
altitudes and the airplane is compelled to fly over adjoining property at a very low height before zooming up in the process of
turning at the end of the orchard or field. An express exception
for industrial flying was originally provided in the minimum altitude regulation of the federal air traffic rules.' 7 Such low flying
may not occur more than once a year but conceivably can cause
considerable injury depending on the use to which the neighboring
land is put. Very likely the owner of a house or poultry farm
situated on property adjacent to a citrus fruit orchard would find
the spraying by airplane very objectionable.
(2)

Flight of Aircraft in Taking-off and Landing.

In taking-off and in landing, aircraft may create the same type
of annoyances that they do in normal flight but the annoyances are
greater due to the forced proximity of the aircraft to the surface.
From the point of view of the landowners, such flying should be
treated separately from ordinary flying for several reasons. First, flying immediately following taking-off and preceding landing must, of
necessity, occur close to the ground, and this cannot be altered
as long as the present type of airplane is in use. The average
airplane gains altitude at a ratio of 1 to 7, i. e., climbs one foot
vertically for every seven feet traveled horizontally. With the
15. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., discussed in note
4, involved a Goodyear blimp.
16. See "The Farmer takes to the Air," Travel, March, 1932.
17. See Air Commerce Regulations, Aero. Bull. No. 7, Sec. 74 (G) (2),
effective Jan. 1, 1929. The clause "except where indispensable for industrial
flying" has now been eliminated.
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development and popularization of the autogiro or some similar
type, the angle of climb may be increased and the unusual annoyance and danger attendent to taking-off and landing may be eliminated. 18 Second, taking-off and landing is the most dangerous
part of flying. Motor trouble, now relatively rare, more generally
occurs when the engines are "opened wide" for the take-off.
The proximity to the ground often affords the aviator neither time
nor room to make a safe emergency landing. Again, the perfection of some type of aircraft such as the autogiro will minimize
this danger. Third, the annoyances created by taking-off and landing are not only concentrated on the property adjoining the airport, but on such of that property as is located in the direction
of the prevailing wind.1 9 This is because the federal air traffic
rules require all take-offs and landing to be made upwind "when
'20
practicable.
The character of the neighborhood in which the airport is located will undoubtedly have an important bearing upon the attitude
of the courts in handling the annoyances created thereby. A
dilemma confronts the airport operator in that if the proposed
airport be located in a built-up neighborhood, it will add to the
already existing city annoyances and may itself disturb and endanger the lives of countless people who inhabit the immediate
vicinity. On the other hand, if the airport be located in the country, the lone resident who, perchance, lives next to the proposed
airport may properly demand a freedom from noise and other
disturbances which would not be considered objectionable in the
city. However, as airports are an indispensable part of aviation,
their location near the center of large cities is commercially desirable.2 ' Thus, a distinction can be made between commercial
18. It is reported that, from a dead start and climbing at an angle of
34 degrees, an autogiro with full load can easily clear a 330 foot gas tank
while flying a horizontal distance of 675 feet. See Aero Digest, May 1932,
p. 100, advertisement of Kellett Autogiro.
19. In an address before the American Bar Association in 1929, Logan
said: "The greatest bugaboo, of course, is the noise. How long the aircraft
will continue to be accompanied by such overwhelming and overpowering
noise, is a matter which only the engineers and their patron saint, St.
Patrick, can answer. * * * While airplanes were new and novel, the
question of noise was one of slight importance. They were entertaining.
But when the novelty wears off and when night flying with its departure
and arrival of planes at all hours, as at our union stations, has become an
accomplished fact, the householder whose home adjoins the airport is going

to find that his days are hideous and his nights are sleepless." 54 A. B. A.
Rep. 869, 876-7; 2 Air Law Rev. 94.
20. Air Commerce Reg., Aero. Bull. No. 7, Sec. 75A.
21.

"The West Chester Airport Company, which operates an airport

in Armonk, New York, has been indicted by the Grand Jury of West
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airports used for passenger transportation and fields devoted to
student instruction.
Several types of flying ordinarily take place only in the vicinity of airports. Students making solo practice flights are required by the federal Air Commerce Regulations to keep within
a safe gliding distance of the field from which they are receiving
instruction.2 2 Moreover, the greater part of student instruction
consists in practicing take-offs and landings. 23 The federal regulations require acrobatic flying to take place at not less than 1,000
feet horizontally from the edge of the airport. 24 This automatically places acrobatic flying, which is recognizedly dangerous, over
adjoining or other property.25 Air races and flying exhibitions
usually take place over and near airports. Closed-course air races
consist of flying at very low altitudes around pylons, at least one
of which is located on the airport. Waivers of the minimum safe
altitude regulation are issued for such races at the discretion of
the Department of Commerce.26 Frequently the racers, in circling
the pylons, are forced by their high speed to fly over adjoining
private property at an extremely low altitude, thus endangering
lives and property.
Already several law suits have involved aircraft take-off and
landing operations. A concrete example of injury caused by an
airplane in selecting a field for an emergency landing was presented to the Comptroller General in 1923:
"An army aviator, flying about dusk, intended to land on X's enclosed
field, descended to about 50 feet from the ground, when cattle loomed up
before him. He promptly increased his altitude and landed in the next
Chester County for maintaining of a public nuisance. Nothing is charged
against the management of the airport, save the dust and noise of taking
off and landing." Wenneman, Municipal Airports, p. 277. The suit came to
trial in the spring of 1931 and ended in a hung jury 9 to 3, in favor of the
airport. No further action has been taken. People v. Smith, 206 App. Div.
642 and 726, 198 N. Y. S. 940 and 199 N. Y. S. 942 (1923) reversed 119
Misc. 294, 196 N. Y. S. 241 (1922), held that a hydroplane operating from
Lake George without a muffler violated a New York Penal Statute requiring certain "floating structures" to have mufflers. The lower court, although
reversed by the above holding, stated "This form of commercialization
of the planes on a small body of water may well constitute a nuisance,
which it is within the power of the Legislature to abate."
22. Air Commerce Reg., Aero. Bull. No. 7, Chap. 5, Sec. 46(e). Student instruction over plaintiff's land was objected to in Glatt v. Page and
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.
23. See Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201, 203.
24. Air Commerce Reg., Aero. Bull., No. 7, Chap. 7 (2) (B).
25. See note 11 supra, for example of special restrictions placed on
acrobatic flying by courts.
26. Air Commerce Reg., Aero. Bull. No. 7, Chap. 8, Sec. 82.
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field, while the frightened cattle broke through the fence. X sought
compensation for the expense incurred in rounding up the cattle and repairing the fence, and damages for the shrinkage in the weight of the
cattle, caused by fright and loss of feed." The claim was disallowed by the
was no negligence shown in
Comptroller General on the ground that there
2T
the manner of selecting the landing field.
In this case the aviator was a military pilot who was forced to
land. The injury was entirely accidental and the airplane did not
come in contact with the plaintiff's land. The farmer, conversely,
suffered specific damage in that his fence was broken and his cattle
lost weight. In Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, 28 a Pennsylvania Quarter Sessions case of 1922, a farmer objected to the
noise of airplanes operated by "gypsy" flyers who had rented the
adjoining tract as a landing field and who flew over his property in
taking-off.
A prosecution was brought under the Pennsylvania
game-laws of 1905 for "wilfully to enter upon land," and the suit
was dismissed. The most important decisions involving objections
of property owners to the taking-off and landing of airplanes over
their property are the Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 29 and
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. 0 In each of these cases, airports were located beside improved country estates and the
property owners sought injunctions against the airports and against
the flying over their land. In the former case, the injunction was
denied, and in the latter case an injunction was granted against
the entire operation of the airport. This difference can largely be
explained by the differences in the two situations and will be discussed subsequently. 8 '
The mooring mast now coming into use as a terminal for
large airships, such as found on the Empire State Building in
New York City, raises problems peculiarly its own. It is not entirely analogous to the airport because, if the mooring mast is
sufficiently high, the airship need never travel through the lower
27. 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. R.46. From Pickett, "The Empire
State Building Mooring Mast," 2 Air. L. Rev. 130, 136 (1931), and New
York Times, Mar. 1, 1931.
28. Not officially reported-see 1928 U. S. Av. R. 39.
29. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
30. District Court: 47 F. (2d) 929 (N. D., Ohio 1930). Decision of
Circuit Court of Appeals: 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931).
31. Rex v. Cameron (Arundel County Bench, Oct. 7, 1929), is an English case involving low flying in landing. There an aviator was summoned
for flying "so low over gardens, roads and houses, that it was dangerous
to the public." In defense, it was shown that low flying took place in landing upon a licensed field in the prescribed manner, and that the altitude
was reasonable under the conditions of wind and weather that day. The
prosecution was dismissed. 93 Justice of the Peace 661 (1929).
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airspace of adjoining landowners as the present aircraft do in
landing and taking-off from an airport. However, the modern
airship is so long and bulky that unless the proprietor of the
mast owns considerable land about his mast the stern end of the
aircraft will swing out over neighboring land. A moored airship
is distinguishable from an airship in normal flight in that the
moored ship is a permanent encroachment in certain senses. The
nose of the ship would be affixed to the mast and the remainder
of the giant body all6wed to swing with the wind. Unless the
wind shifts, the ship would be comparatively stationary during
the time in which it is discharging and taking on freight and passengers. The moored airship perhaps partakes of some of the
characteristics of the flagpole or swinging shutter that overhangs
adjoining land. At least while moored the airship will probably
not be found objectionable because of the noise, but the constant
noisy approach and casting off from the mast may form the basis
of complaint by adjoining owners. Unusual danger of objects
falling on neighboring land while making fast can probably be
eliminated, and any objections to the shadows cast by the airship
82
would seem to be entirely too fanciful.
(3)

Operation of Airport Apart from Flying.

Neither in practice nor in the attitude of the courts can the
''on surface" activities of an airport be considered separately from
the flying that takes place therefrom. These activities, however,
may in themselves constitute a substantial annoyance to the adjoining residents who are accustomed to a quiet neighborhood. The
airport is at best a noisy place. Aircraft engines must be warmedup before taking-off, which process takes as long as twenty minutes
in the case of commercial planes using large motors. Unless the
field has a hard surface, or is sodded, cindered, oiled or is otherwise treated, great quantities of dust are blown up in dry seasons
by the aircraft in warming-up the motor and in taking-off. Besides
hangars for storage, a machine and general repair shop is an essential part of a fully equipped airport. For night flying the field
must be equipped with a rotating beacon, green and yellow border
lights, and red obstruction lights on the top of structures in the
immediate vicinity, such as telegraph poles. Aside from these
lights, modern airports are equipped with immense floodlights
which illuminate the landing area to aid aircraft in landing. There
32.

See Pickett, supra.
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are usually found a garage, filling station, parking space, and
restaurant at airports. Airports expect and provide for handling
large crowds during exhibitions and air races.
Several instances of legal action against the operations of airports are reported. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. is the most
conspicuous example. Objections were made to the noise and dust
in warming up the motors, the proposed flood-lights, the attraction
of crowds, and the congestion on the highways leading to the air83
port.
(4)

Contact by the Aircraft or Any of Its Contents with the
Tangible Property of the Landowner.

Some crashes will inevitably occur due to a variety of causes
-weather conditions, incompetency of pilot, errors of personnel,
faulty construction, or improper inspection of aircraft or motor."'
Accidents are decreasing, but it is not likely that they will ever be
entirely eliminated. Occasionally objects fall or are thrown from
aircraft which damage the unprotected landowner beneath. A recent crash illustrates some of the difficulties involved in adjusting
the liability of the aviator for damage to property and persons
on the ground:
On Saturday afternoon of April 30, 1932, two reserve officers on
inactive duty took up a national guard plane from the Chicago Municipal
Airport. For undetermined reasons, a forced landing was attempted "downwind" on a vacant lot within the city limits on the south side. The plane
broke through a trolley wire and telephone post, crashed against a brick
house and exploded. The pilots were killed and the house almost completely
33. Other instances may be mentioned: N. Y. Herald Tribune, Aug.
22, 1929, at 2, reports, "A hearing before a Justice of the Peace in ,Vestchester County, New York, against an airport owner on the charge of conducting a nuisance." Newman, "Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases," 29
Col. L. Rev. 1039 (1929); cf. Murphy, "The Legal Problems of Aviation,"
64 U. S. L. Rev. 524, 525 (1930).
In Bosworth-Smith v. Gwynnes, Ltd., 89 L. J. Ch. (n. s.) 368 (Ch. Div.,
1919), "an engineering company was enjoined from testing airplane engines
in 'an exceptionally quiet residential place.' The noises created were greater
than those of other industrial enterprises in the neighborhood." Pickett,
supra, p. 143.
In Glatt v. Page, referred to in note 4, the landing and taking-off of
airplanes were found particularly annoying.
The annual report for 1929 of the Director of Aeronautics of Ohio
states "In the northern part of the state an airport has been placed next
to a private game preserve. Aircraft flying low over the marshes frightens
away all the game. Either the airport or the game preserve must be
abandoned." Tuttle and Bennett, "Extent of Power of Congress over Aviation," 5 Univ. of Cinc. L. Rev. 261, 262 (1931).
34. Frequently the complete demolition of the plane and occupants prevents determining the precise cause of the crash.
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burned, due to the explosion of gasoline and high wind. People in the
house barely had time to escape uninjured. The trouble is said to have
been brought about by the failure to correct the altitude adjustment of the
carburetor. Low flying over the city and inexperience of the pilot in
handling the plane in the strong wind, undoubtedly contributed to bringing
about the crash. Open country lay a half mile south of where the landing
was attempted. The airplane belonged to the Government. Both flyers are
dead and were at the time in Government service. The piloting of the
plane was in charge of one of the men and it is doubtful whether negligence
5
can be proved. In this case what redress is available to the landowner?

In Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., an objection was raised to
the dropping of circulars from airplanes in such a manner as to
fall upon and litter up the plaintiffs' lawn. A complaint was filed
in 1929 against a parachute jumper who landed in the plaintiff's
tree.38 Many suits have been threatened or brought as a result
s7
Crimof an airplane falling upon the property of a landowner.
35. Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1932, Chicago Daily News, May 2, 1932.
36. "The summer of 1929 has witnessed the filing of a complaint in a
New Jersey Recorder's Court arising from a parachute drop ending in an
oak tree on complainant's farm." New York Herald-Tribune, June 4, 1929,
at 4, cited in Newman, supra, and Murphy, supra.
37. "In an English case (unreported), a British Aeronaut found a field
into which he was descending, occupied by a cow, and apparently the cow
resented the interference and made a hostile demonstration. Honest endeavors to avoid a collision were fruitless, for the bovine plunged below the
aeroplane just as it reached the ground. The results were disastrous to the
animal and disagreeable to the airman, for the owner recovered damages for
her loss." Murphy, supra, p. 531.
In Sysack v. DeLisser Air Service Corp. (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. N. Y.
1931); 1931 U. S. Av. R. 7, a suit was brought against an airplane company
for damages resulting from striking plaintiff's house, and an injunction was
sought against all further flying over plaintiff's property. The town of
Hempstead was joined in the action "on the theory that they have invited
such airplanes to invade plaintiff's superjacent rights without taking such by
condemnation and are thus participating in a continuous trespass on his
close." Motion to dismiss complaint was granted.
In Chicago, during the summer of 1919, a "dirigible balloon fell into a
bank, wrecked the place, and killed more than a dozen persons.

.

.

. In

the case of the Chicago bank, the owners of the dirigible voluntarily paid
for the losses caused." Woodhouse, "Who Dropped the Monkey Wrench
on Your Head?" 9 Flying 38-9 (1920).
Cf. Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co. and New York case
discussed in Law Notes (see note 8) where injunctions against flying were
sought after crashes had occurred.
Examples of damage resulting from early accidents are reported by
Gov. Baldwin in 1910: "In June, 1910, an aeroplane which was flying
around an agricultural show at Worcester, in England, as one of the attractions of the exhibition, became unmanageable and fell upon a crowd of
spectators. One of them was killed, and others injured. On the same day
at an aviation meet at Budapest a German aviator lost control of his
biplane, and it dashed into the Grandstand. Six persons were injured, and
two very seriously. A few days later, a young man employed at an amusement park near Newark, New Jersey, to make daily ascents in a dirigible
airship of the Zeppelin order, flew into the heart of New York City, ran

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

inal prosecutions have followed accidents in several instances.8
Although a crash or other forced landing may cause little
damage to the landowner's property, he may dispute the aviator's
right of access to the plane for the purpose of inspection or removal, because it amounts to trespass on his land. In addition
the landowner may claim the right to hold the plane until he exacts
a price or recovers compensation for the injury caused not only
by the landing of the plane itself but also by third parties attracted
to his property as a result of the wreck.89
against a chimney of the Hall of Records in the City Hall Park, swung

thence over to Brooklyn, and finally landed in the top of a tree on one of
its streets." Baldwin, "Rules for Aerial Navigation," 35 Am. Bar Assn.
Rep. 898, 903 (1910). For similar balloon accidents, see the following cases:

Platt v. Erie County Agricultural Society, 149 N. Y. S. 520, 164 App. Div.
99 (1914); Morrison v. MacLean, 160 Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475; Smith v.
Cumberland Co. Agr. Soc., 163 N. C. 346 (1913); Roper v. Ulster County
Agricultural Society, 136 App. Div. 95, 120 N. Y. S. 644 (1909) ; Canney v.
Rochester Agricultural and Mechanical Assn., 76 N. H. 60, 79 Atd. 517
(1911); Richmond & March Railway Co. v. Moore's Adm., 94 Va. 493, 27
S. E. 70 (1897) ; Smith v. Benick, 89 Md. 610, 41 At. 56 (1898) ; Bernier
v. Woodstock Agr. Soc., 88 Conn. 558, 92, Atd. 160 (1914) ; Burns v. Herman,
48 Colo. 359, 113 Pac. 310 (1910).
Most of these cases are reported in
1928 U. S. Av. Report.
38. Some time before 1920, an "aviator who landed in a grass plot in
Van Cortlandt Park, New York, was arrested, charged with 'unlawfully
disturbing the grass in a grass plot in Van Cortlandt Park by landing there
with an aeroplane without a permit from the proper authorities." Woodhouse, Textbook of Aerial Laws (Frederick A. Stokes Co., New York,
1920), 7.
In People V. Crossan (Dist. Ct. of App., 2nd Dist. of Cal., 1927) 261
Pac. 531, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 77, an aviator was convicted of manslaughter
for negligently killing two bathers, in making a forced landing in the surf
at Venice, California. On appeal, the case was reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
In Rex. v. Henderson, an aviator was found to have been flying low
to the danger of the public over the Ascot races. See note 10. See also
Rex v. Cameron, in which a prosecution for low flying was dismissed. See
note 31. Cf. English case where members of the Royal Flying Corps were
arrested for low flying and cutting telegraph wires. See note 4.
39. In the Shenandoah disaster in 1925, the claim of the farmers, on
whose land the dirigible fell, for damages was resisted on the ground that
some had charged the p.blic admission for the privilege of erntering their
land. "The dirigible 'Shenandoah,' while passing over Eastern Ohio was
torn to pieces by a storm through no fault of the officers in charge, the
parts falling on the lands of certain farmers. Curiosity seekers gathered
from all parts of the country, trampling down the vegetation and destroying
fences. Some of the farmers applied to the United States Government for
damages. It developed that in certain instances the farmers had charged
admission for the privilege of entering upon their land." Jome, "Property
in the Air as Affected by the Airplane and Radio," 4 Jour. Land & Pub.
Util. 257 266 (1928).
In Guille v. Swan (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 19 Johns. 381 (1822), a balloonist
was held liable for the damages to the plaintiff's turnip patch, committed
by some 200 curiosity seekers, as well as for the damage due to his balloon.
"In the New York Sun, June 28, 1914, it is said that a landowner in
France, who sued three aeroplane firms whose machines continually passed
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The
sons on
problem
bears on
(5)

extent of the aviator's liability for injury to third perthe ground, as a result of direct contact, is a distinct
and will not be considered in this paper other than as it
the right of flight itself.

Obstructions to Aviation by Structures on the Ground.

On March 8, 1932, a tri-motored plane of the Century Airlines crashed
into an abandoned windmill 30 feet high and 300 feet from the Curtiss-Steinberg airport at East St. Louis, Illinois, where the plane was practicing night
landings, with the result that two of the six pilots in the plane were
killed. The transport company knew the windmill was a menace to the
use of the airport, and had unsuccessfully sought permission to remove, light
or mark the windmill. It is reported that the transport company had even
offered to purchase the field at a price it considered reasonable, but that the
farmer who owned the windmill was endeavoring to secure an exorbitant
40
purchase price.

Instances of structures on the ground interfering with aviation
have been numerous but have seldom reached the courts. They,
however, promise to become more serious in and around airports
unless the angle of climb is radically changed by perfection of the
autogiro or some new type of craft. In dealing with these obstructions, the courts will find that the same formula will not
satisfactorily handle all structures in all places. For instance, obstructions which interfere with taking-off or landing from airports,
cannot be classed with structures which interfere with ordinary
flying. Normally, instances of the latter type will be relatively
rare. It is reported, however, that high tension electric lines have
interfered with the carriage of mail between Cleveland and Chicago during severe weather when the mail planes were forced to
fly close to the ground. Buildings which are much taller than
neighboring structures may prove a hazard to aviation. If the
landowner is to retain his ancient freedom of building upon his
land as high as he pleases without regard to the character and
height of buildings in the neighborhood or to the interests of aviation, then provision for lighting unusually tall structures becomes
desirable in order to prevent collision in inclement weather. In
such a situation, must the landowner permit the Department of
over his property, has been awarded three hundred dollars damages. The
court considered that the air can not by its very nature be privately owned
and that it is absolutely free, but it awarded damages in respect of the too
frequent landings of defendants' airmen on plaintiff's property." 2 C. J.
304, n. 40a. Cited in Woodhouse, Textbook of Aerial Laws (New York:
Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1920), p. 7; Joine, supra, p. 267.
40. Chicago Daily News, Mar. 8, 1932.
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Commerce or aviation interests to light his building, or must he
go further and maintain the lights at his own expense?
Many types of structures near airports may be dangerous to
aircraft in taking-off and landing. 1 Numerous accidents have occurred in landing because the pilot misjudged the Jieight of trees
and power lines at the edge of an airport, with the result that he
collided with such obstructions or "over-shot" the airport, i. e.,
failed to land and stop rolling before reaching the far end of the
field. Again, planes have failed to clear obstructions bordering
an airport because the plane failed-due to wind or field conditions-to take-off and climb as usual. Without malicious motive,
the adjoining landowner may erect a tall building or put up towers
for the suspension of a wireless antennae which would interfere
with the taking-off from and landing on the airport. Attempts
are now being made, by the use of zoning ordinances, to restrict
the height of buildings and structures to as low as 35 feet in
the immediate vicinity of municipal airports. 42 Captive balloons
are coming into use for the suspension of advertisements which, if
permitted near airports, may interfere with flying as high as 500
feet.
The old problem of the "spite fence" arises when structures are
erected for the express and sole purpose of preventing aircraft
from flying over land at low altitudes. The following instance is
reported:
"A threat by a Long Island golf club to erect a fence, 125 feet in
height, at the boundary line between club and flying field, because low
flying, in taking-off and landing, prevented peaceful enjoyment of the club's
facilities. . . ,,"4

41. "In general it has been found that the aviator needs protection
from obstacles such as these in leaving and approaching an airport of
reasonable size according to present standards, for a distance of about
1500 feet in all directions from the outer boundaries of the port." Hubbard
McClintock & Williams, Airports, Their

Location,

Administration

and

Legal Basis (I, Harv. City Planning Studies, 1930) p. 126.
"42. "Report of Committee on Airport Zoning and Eminent Domain,"
2 Air Commerce Bulletin, No. 13, p. 325 (Jan. 2, 1931).

43. New York Times, June 20, 1929; cited in Newman, "Damage Liability in Aircraft Cases," 29 Col. L. Rev. 1039 (1929).
In Glatt v. Page, the Nebraska case referred to in note 4, it is reported
that before Mr. Glatt brought suit and after the aviators had refused to
desist from flying over his property, he "employed a man to assist him
at digging post holes along his property line adjoining the flying field. The
holes had all been made and a number of wooden forms built to form a
fence high enough to keep the planes from landing or taking off in the

direction of his farm, when an alarmed delegation from the Lincoln Chamber of Commerce sought him out and persuaded him to desist, temporaily
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In treating these instances, the court will not find the old type of
spite fence entirely .analogous to the aviation spite fence because
in the former the purpose was to prevent light and air from passing from the fence-owner's land on to his neighbor's property.
The purpose of the aviation spite fence is to prevent aircraft from
flying over the fence-owner's land at altitudes lower than the height
of the fence. A single cable suspended between two towers would
be sufficient to prevent the intrusion by aircraft and would not
interfere with the normal passage of air and light." If airplanes
are thought to be dangerous instrumentalities and the extreme
interpretation of the maxim, cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum, is accepted, the landowner may consider that he is acting
within his exclusive property rights in preventing aircraft from
flying overhead. If he is conceded exclusive control of the lower
airspace, the landowner's spite fence would not seem to be such
an unreasonable method of protecting his property as would be
5
his shooting at low flying aircraft.
at least." Lowell, "Who Is Owner of Air Above the Land?" Aircraft,
Oct. 1929, p. 22.
M. Coquerel erected in 1913 or shortly before "a wooden fence, more
than 30 feet high, surmounted with iron spikes, on his land facing the
Clement-Bayard hangar at Trosly-Breuil, the object being to prevent the
dirigibles from flying over M. Coquerel's land. The courts held that M.
Coquerel's action was an abuse of his rights of property and ordered him
to remove the obstruction." R. J. L. A. 1913, pp. 83, 336. Spaight, Aircraft
in Peace and the Law (London: MacMillan & Co., 1919) p. 59.
44. See illustration of "balloon 'apron' or nets, which were suspended
at great heights in England as an obstacle to German air raiders." See
Woodhouse, Textbook of Aerial Laws, opp. p. 3.
45. In Glatt v. Page, the Nebraska case referred to in note 4, it is
reported that after the airport proprietor had refused to cease flying over
Mr. Glatt's farm, "the matter developed into a miniature feud. Mr. Glatt
alleged that the planes flew over his farm more than was necessary. The
flyers declared that the farmer carried a shotgun with him at his work in
the fields and brandished it whenever a low-flying plane appeared over
the place. They were not to be so easily bluffed, they said. Mr. Glatt's
first offensive measure was to erect an elevated target on his land and
invite his neighbors over for target practice at that time of day when
air traffic at the airport was heaviest. This move brought no harm to
the aviators, but they insisted it was through no lack of intent and attempt
on the part of Mr. Glatt." Lowell, supra, p. 22.
In Rex v.Reed (Dorset Assizes, May 26, 1927), a gentleman farmer
was "indicted for attempting maliciously to wound the pilot, for a common
assault on the pilot (by shooting at him with a gun) and for wilful damage
to the aeroplane which, as a fact, had a number of shot holes in it. The
grand jury found a true bill only on the last count, and the trial jury
acquitted the accused even upon that." (At p. 544.) It was admitted that
the pilot flew over the defendant's farm at an altitude of 50 feet, clearing
tree tops by about 3 feet, and that he annoyed defendant, frightened his
mother, and disturbed his cattle and horses. The farmer had complained
to the police of previous low flying but no action was taken other than to
advise him to write to the Secretary of the Aero Club. The Times, April
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The adjustment of the foregoing conflicting claims must take
into consideration many factors other than the bare legitimate demands of each interest. The factor of judicial administration is
of great importance. The adjustment of disputes should be handled
speedily and without undue cost, and each interest should know
in advance the relative extent of its rights. To prove a nuisance,
several witnesses must be present and various kinds of evidence
offered. In the clearest case, this would involve considerable expense, in some cases the expense becoming prohibitive. An administrative body of experts might well be established to settle
individual disputes, for aviation cases almost universally involve
so many technical questions that the problems can be much better
handled by a specialized commission with an informal and relatively flexible procedure. Testimony of lay witnesses will be unsatisfactory in almost any case, but this testimony can be made
more definite and can be far better evaluated by a commission composed of persons experienced in aviation matters than by the present judicial process involving a jury of citizens who understand
little or nothing of flying and a court that is* usually quite unfamiliar with these technical questions.
The airspace is almost boundless and aviators can now fly
at great heights, but to require that all flying be carried on at a
height at which it would never conflict with the interest of the
landowner would be to make aviation in the immediate future
commercially impossible. Today, much commercial flying occurs
at about 500 feet, because wind and visibility are frequently most
favorable at that altitude-particularly when traveling against the
wind-and because more time and fuel are necessary in climbing
to higher altitudes. These relatively higher altitudes are maintained
when traveling with the wind although at such height the air may
be more bumpy and cause inconvenience to the passengers. While
it is true that flying in the stratosphere would be more rapiddue to a prevailing west-to-east wind of over 400 miles an houras yet no quick and economic means has been invented to reach
such height. All of these factors indicate the difficulties presented
in adjusting the interests of the landowner and the aviator, and
27th, and May 27th, 1927; "Low-Flying Aircraft," 91 Justice of the Peace
543-4 (1927).
Baldwin states: "There have already been instances of shooting at
balloons in mere wantonness." "Law of the Airship-Possible Methods
and Scope of Regulation," 4 Am. J. Int. Law 95, 105 (1910).
During the late war, Holland asserted her national sovereignty by
firing upon armed German zeppelins which flew over her territory. Spaight,
Aircraft in Peace and the Law, p. 205 and p. 214.
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question the propriety of burdening the ordinary courts with these
technical questions.
II.

ATTEMPTED SOLUTION

Turning, now, to the legal side of the above conflict of interests, any compromise to be advanced must be predicated upon the
viewpoint adopted toward the legal status of airspace. The ancient
maxim "cujus est solurn ejus est usque ad coelum," usually transslated, "He who owns the land owns up to the sky", forms the
starting point of this inquiry. Next, attention must be directed
to the application of the maxim in adjudicated cases, because, after
all, the actions that are allowed-whether trespass, nuisance, or
ejectment-and the relief granted thereunder are what actually
show the extent of the rights of the two parties. Remedial relief
becomes the criterion of substantive rights. And, lastly, new public policy must be formed which will weigh the economic interests
and bridge the gaps in precedent due to the novelty of aircraft
and the situations created by their use.
From a study of the origin, history and cases applying the
maxim, legal writers have advanced opinions as to the legal status
of airspace. These conclusions vary widely but may be roughly
classified into the following four theories of airspace ownership :46
(1) The landowner has unrestricted ownership of airspace ad
coelum. This is the most inclusive and extreme interpretation of
the maxim. (2) There is no ownership at all of unenclosed
airspace. This theory is the extreme counterpart of the first
theory. (3) There is unrestricted ownership, but the airspace is
subject to an easement of aerial transit at reasonable altitudes.
This theory offers a compromise to the interests of the two parties. (4) There is unrestricted ownership up to a certain altitude
at which height ownership ceases. This is the so-called "zone
theory" of ownership and is likewise a compromise theory. The
46. The following authors have classified the theories of airspace
ownership, one of which contains as many as fourteen theories: Hazeltine,
The Law of the Air (1911) pp. 54-60; Tuttle and Bennett, "Extent of

Power of Congress over Aviation," 5 Univ. of Cinc. L. Rev. 261, 282-7
(1931); Ball, "The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land," 76 Univ. of
Penn. L. Rev. 631, 640-3 (1928) ; Jome, "Property in the Air as Affected
by the Airplane and Radio," 4 Jour. Land & Pub. Util. 257 (1928); Comment, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 569, 571-2 (1919); Falkin, Comment, 16 Corn. L.
Quart. 119, 121-2 (1930); Smith, Comment, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 47, 47-9 (1930);
Hise, "Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or Airspace above Land-

Owner's Premises with Special Reference to Aviation," 16 Ia. L. Rev. 169,
192 (1931) ; Simpson, Comment, 1 Air L. Rev. 272, 273-4 (1930) ; Marvin,
Comment, 10 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 382, 384-5 (1930).
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extent of the zone is designated by such phrases as "lower stratum",
"effective possession", "actual user", and the like.
Each of these theories indicates a different and distinct attitude towards aviation and leads to a different solution of the
economic conflict mentioned. Each sanctions the use of diverse
legal remedies. The task for the jurist is to determine whether
or not precedent compels the adoption of any one theory, whether
the adoption of any of the theories would do violence to precedent,
and lastly to select the theory which will promote the most equitable and fair settlement of the greatest number of problems described in Part I.
Before entering into a study of legal precedent, a brief critical
examination of these four theories of airspace ownership may be
made for the purpose of showing the legal and practical merits
and limitations of each theory.
(1)

Unrestricted Ownership of Airspace by the Landowner.

This first theory is supposedly based upon a literal interpretation of the maxim, cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. It
attempts to grant the landowner the same remedial rights in the
upper airspace as he has in the land or groundspace itself. Every
unauthorized flight of aircraft over private property would be a
technical trespass, quare clausum fregit, irrespective of the altitude
or the annoyances created by the aircraft. This means that for
every flight, which a landowner can prove in court took place
over his property, he can recover at least nominal damages and,
generally, court costs. Such slight reward for trouble and expense
would probably discourage all litigation except where the purpose was to annoy and harass. An injunction would frequently
be granted for repeated trespasses where they might culminate in
4
an easement or servitude. 1
The theory has the advantage of giving the landowner a
maximum of protection for any substantial interference with the
use, enjoyment and value of his property because it permits an
unrestricted use of the action of trespass. The disastrous effects
on aviation occasioned by the adoption of this theory cannot be
foretold. 8 The courts probably would not allow trespass actions
47. The idea that repeated flights will ever lead to an "easement" does
not follow from the mere adoption of this theory of airspace ownership.
That question must be settled independently. See Part VI for a fuller
discussion of this point.
48. Prof. Zollmann summarizes an article by E. H. A. in 19 Green
Bag, 707-17 (1907) which attempts to look into the future and ascertain
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to interfere greatly with flying activities, if only nominal damages
were sought. It is clear that courts can control the awarding of
costs and thus discourage the bringing of actions for nominal
damages. 49 The most unsatisfactory part of the theory is that it
classifies all flying as illegal and leaves practically no rights to the
aviator.
From the strictly legal viewpoint it is not believed that precedent requires the adoption of this theory because the origin,
history and cases adopting the maxim do not indicate that there
is unrestricted private ownership of airspace to all heights. Private ownership is here distinguished from sovereignty.
This was the prevailing concept of airspace ownership among
50
legal scholars prior to the development of aviation, but, in
justice to these scholars, it must be recognized that aviation to
them was an unrealized dream. Since the advent of modern
flying, a few legal writers have grudgingly accepted the theory
as the orthodox common law formula.5' But at the same time,
they have recognized its inability to handle satisfactorily the problems growing out of aviation and have advocated statutory or
constitutional changes. 52 At the present time this view is no longer
seriously advocated. 58
the calamitous consequences of a literal adherence to the maxim. Law
of the Air, p. 11-12.
49. See Part VI.
50. Coke on Littleton, p. 4a; Sheppard's Touchstone of Common Assurances, p. 90; Blackstone, Commentaries, p. 18.
51. Platt, "The Airship as a Trespasser," 7 Ohio L. Rev. 402 (1909)
Meyer, "Trespass by Areoplane," 36 Law Magazine & Rev. 20 (1911)
Williams, "Law of the Air," 131 Law Times 403, 18 Case & Coin. 131
(1911); Richards, "Sovereignty over the Air" (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1912), at p. 13; Editorial, "Aerial Navigation," 19 Va. L. Reg. 550 (1913) ;
New York moot case, see 19 Case & Com. 681 (1913) and 42 A. L. R. 945,
951; Carthew, "Aviation, Its Future and Legal Problems," 63 Sol. J. 418,
419 (1919) ; Senator Sherman, Bill 2593, Jan. 23, 1919, see Bogert, "Problems
in Aviation Law," 6 Corn. L. Quart. 271, 291 (1921) ; Johnson, "Legal
Questions Affecting Federal Control of the Air," 2 Air Information Circular,
No. 181 (1921); Report of the A. B. A. Committee on the Law of
Aviation, 46 A. B. A. Rep. 498 (1921); Plan of Judge Lamb, see MacCracken, "Air Law,"" 57 Am. L. Rev. 97, 99 (1923); Hackett, "Rights in
Air Space and Lord Ellenborough's Dictum," 10 Va. L. Reg. 312, 316 (1924) ;
Annotation, 42 A. L. R. 945, 946 (1926); Couture, "The Michigan Statute
Regulating Aerial Navigation is Void Insofar as it is in Derogation of
Vested Rights," 11 Univ. of Detroit Bi-Monthly Law Rev. 159 (1928);
Bingham, "Program of the National Aeronautic Association as Related to
Uniformity in Aeronautic Legislation and Regulation" (address), proceedings
of Natl. Conf. on Unif. Aero. Regulatory Laws, Dec. 16-7, 1930 (Monograph,
Govt. Printing Off.) p. 24, at p. 24 & 29; Hise, see note 46, p. 193-4.
52. Williams, see note 51; Editorial, "Aerial Navigation," 19 Va. L.
Reg. 550 (1913) ; Carthew, see note 51; Annotation, 42 A. L. R. 945 (1926);
Bingham, see note 51; Hise, see note 46.
53. However, see the discussion now going on in England on the question as to whether "sky writing" by means of a search light constitutes a

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

(2)

No Ownership of Unenclosed Airspace.

This theory denies the right to bring trespass unless there
is contact with a physical object on the land-including buildings,
trees, and other objects attached to the soil. The action of nuisance would be the only remedy for low, dangerous, or annoying
flights of aircraft which do not actually touch something on the
plaintiff's land. Thus, if an airplane should fly over a field at an
altitude of one yard, over a garden at one foot, or clear the top
of a house by one inch, or miss the side of a skyscraper by the
fraction of an inch, there would be no right to bring trespass
quare clausum fregit. Unless damages or danger could be shown
there would be no redress. An action on the case for nuisance,
however, would lie if the flights were repeated and caused provable damages.
Such an extreme position infringes the "property rights" that
the ordinary man and the average judge concede to the landowner.
The position appears to be inconsistent with the cases allowing
trespass against shooting through the lower airspace without contact, and is inconsistent with the dicta of many cases. Standing alone, the theory appears to be entirely inadequate to
protect the landowner from single dangerous flights unless the
action of nuisance is expanded to cover such annoyances, and
unless an injunction is allowed to prevent a number of aviators
from making single dangerous flights over the property of the
same landowner.
The advocates of the view do not assert that it alone affords
adequate protection to the landowner. They contemplate police
regulations, fixing the minimum altitudes of flight, in the interests
of the safety of both the landowner and aviator. Low, dangerous
flying would thus be prevented by criminal prosecutions instituted
by the state upon complaint of landowners or special state officers.
This procedure would relieve the landowner from the responsibility and expense of maintaining a suit in which only nominal
damages may be recovered.
The doctrine that there is no ownership of unenclosed airspace is now advocated by the American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law which suggests a modification of the
old Uniform State Law for Aeronautics of 1922 in favor of a
provision which will leave the courts free to adopt this second
trespass. 24 Flight 420 (May 13, 1932), and Sweeney, "Rights of Neighboring Landowners," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 393, 396, n. 8 (1932).
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position.54 The theory has had many advocates among the recent writers who have given serious attention to the problem,55
but on the other hand, has been subject to severe criticism.58
Certainly legislatures, and the administrative officers who work
under them, as contrasted with the courts, would be given maximum freedom to adjust the conflict of the two interests. A settlement could be made according to the opinion of what was socially
desirable. This result follows because a denial of ownership takes
airspace out of the category of "property" protected by the "due
process" clause of the federal constitution. Abundant protection,
however, can be afforded every interest of the landowner, through
the police power. The extent to which the courts, under this
theory, would allow the legislatures by statutes to take away their
rights to determine to what extent the landowner's use and enjoyment should be protected, is doubtful.
(3)

Ownership of Airspace Subject to an Easement for Aerial
Transit.

The third theory begins like the first by asserting that airspace is owned by the landowner to an unlimited height. The
ownership is burdened, however, by a public easement for aerial
transit. Aerial transit is considered a privileged entry of the airspace at such height, presumably, as does not unreasonably interfere with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface. All other
flying is non-privileged against which an action of trespass will lie,
regardless of the height. Before the development of aviation, the
easement was considered to have been dormant, but, as it ran in
favor of the public, the prescriptive limitation did not operate.57
The public right of passage through airspace is thought to be analogous to both the easement of navigation which the common law
54. Report of the Standing Committee on Aeronautical Law of the
American Bar Association, Sept. 1931; see 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 545
(1931). This theory was urged upon the federal Circuit Court of Appeals
in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. in the brief filed for the defendants.
The theory was also suggested by Salmond in his work on Torts (7th ed.)

237.

55. McNair, "The Beginnings and the Growth of Aeronautical Law,"

1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 383 388 (1930) ; Simpson, Comment, 1 Air L. Rev.
272 (1930) ; Logan, "Aviation and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum," 16 St.

Louis L. Rev. 303. (1931); Tuttle and Bennett, see note 46; Comment,
15 Minn. L. Rev. 318, 326 (1931) ; Willebrandt, Brief Amicus Curiae, in
C. C. A. 6, Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.
56. Hayden, "Objections to the New Uniform Aeronautical Code," 18

A. B. A. Jour. 121 (1932); MacChesney, Remarks Before Am. Bar Assn.,
56 A. B. A. Rep. 86 (1931).
57. Zollmann, "Law of the Air," p. 10-11.
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gave over navigable streams where the stream beds were privately
owned, 58 and also to the easement to use a public highway
where the sub-soil was private property.59 Many have challenged
60
the value of these analogies.
Such an easement does not permit every kind of flying over
private property. Instead, it is limited to aerial transit. Thus,
hovering over private property by an airship or autogiro or circular flying will be a non-privileged entry against which an action
of trespass would lie. In the same class would come all types
of stunt flying and student instruction. If the easement were
limited strictly to commerce, even greater difficulty would result.
This is the theory that apparently underlies the old Uniform State
Law of Aeronautics0 1 and the federal Air Commerce Act of 1926.
Between 1920 and 1926 this appears to have been the prevailing
theory among legal scholars who seriously treated the present
problem.61 Since 1926 the theory has found few advocates 5 and
many critics.6 ' It was again advanced in 1931 by the committee
of the American Law Institute on the restatement of the law of
torts.65
Legally, there is an absence of direct precedent showing an
easement of aerial transit. Technically, an easement implies that
there is property and ownership in the space in which the easement is a limitation. The same lack of precedent to show that
airspace is owned without limit upwards, in support of the first
58. Lee, "Civil Aeronautics-Legislative History of the Air Commerce
Act of 1926" (Washington: corrected to Aug. 1, 1928) ; Mollica, "The
Extent of the Right of the Private Owner of Land to the Space Above,"
11 Univ. of Detroit Bi-Monthly L. Rev. 13 (1926).
59. Report of the Am. Bar Ass'n Committee on the Law of Aviation,
46 A. B. A. Rep. 498 (1921).
60. Marshall, "Some Legal Problems of the Aeronaut," 6 Ill. L. Quart.
50 (1923); Logan, Reply to General MacChesney, 56 A. B. A. Rep. 89, 90
(1931) ; Newman, "Aviation Law and the Constitution," 39 Yale L. Jour.
1113, 1128-9 (1930) ; Tuttle & Bennett, see note 46.
61. The brief filed by counsel for the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America, as Arnicus Curiae in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp.,

apparently approved this theory by contending that the navigable water
analogy was applicable. As the right of the public to travel on navigable
streams is superior to the right of the private riparian or stream-bed
owner, the brief gives the theory a very pro-aviation turn by asserting that
the landowner cannot complain if his enjoyment is cut down by proper
air transit.
62. Hazeltine, see note 46, p. 77; Davids, Law of Motor Vehicles, p.
292; Bogert, see note 51; Lee, see note 58; Mollica, see note 58, pp. 138, 146.
63. MacChesney, see note 56.
64. See note 60.
65. Tenative Draft No. 7, see Reporter's explanatory note appended to
section 1002; 1931 U. S. Av. R. 280, 286.

LANDOWNER AND AVIATOR

theory, exists here. Transferring the easement concept to a new
situation, where it lacks the historical meaning that has grown
up about the term, has been thought to court undue confusion and
difficulty. The theory leaves the right of the aviator in an extremely nebulous state.
(4)

Ownership Up to a Certain Height Only.

The fourth theory asserts that there is private ownership
of airspace up to a certain altitude, which may vary according
to the particular circumstances, and that above this altitude airspace belongs to no one (res nullius) or is community property
(res communis). Airspace is divided, accordingly, into two zones
-upper and lower. The ordinary incidents of ownership exist
in the lower stratum. Any entry into that space, not privileged,
constitutes a technical trespass just as much as if it had been
upon the surface."
Moreover, there is no general privilege existing in favor of the public for purposes of aerial transit in the
lower stratum, but flying in the upper stratum is unrestricted unless it constitutes a nuisance in the same manner that flying over
neighboring land might create a nuisance.
The actual location of the dividing line between the upper
and lower strata is indefinite and may fluctuate with the use to
which the surface is put. Generally speaking, the lower stratum
would be that zone in which repeated flights of aircraft would
constitute a legal nuisance to the use then being made of the surface. Various phrases have been employed to designate this area"lower stratum", "possible effective possession", "effective user",
"actual user". Each phrase is indefinite and allows a court to
declare any flight to come within or without the lower stratum
as the particular circumstances demand. It is possible that a single
height might be fixed for all land but this would appear to be
66. While the allowance of an action of trespass is the distinctive
legal characteristic of the lower stratum, it is believed by some advocates
of the zone theory that this does not necessarily require the recognition of
full rights of ownership in such airspace. Compare the views of the following authors: Kuhn, "The Beginnings of an Aerial Law," 4 Am. J. Intern.
Law 109, 127 (1910) ; Valentine, "The Air-a Realm of Law," 22 Jurid. Rev.
85, 88 (1911); "Aviation and Wireless Telegraphy as Respects the Maxims
and Principles of the Common Law," 71 Cent. L. Jour. 1, 2 (1910);
Wigmore, II Select Cases on the Law of Torts (Boston, 1912) Appen. A,
p. 855-6; Mollica, see note 58, pp. 142, 146; Zollmann, see note 57, pp. 13-14;
Hotchkiss, A Treatise on Aviation Law (New York, 1928) p. 25; McNair,
see note 55; Comment, 15 Minn. Law Rev. 318, 326-7 (1931); Willebrandt,
see note 55.
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entirely arbitrary and would destroy the desirable flexibility of
the theory.
The extent of the lower stratum may vary with the countless
uses to which land may be put although, for most uses, a given
height will afford the owner adequate protection. The decision
in each case must be made by a court, or other administrative
body, upon full presentation of the facts. But this decision need
only indicate that certain flying occurs above or below the hypothetical dividing lines. The chief objection to the fourth view
is the impossibility of determining the dividing line, in advance
of a litigated case. Few courts may render opinions until a case
actually arises, and this fact gives rise to an additional reason for
having these questions dealt with by a special commission. Such
an administrative body, unhampered by seemingly rigid procedural
rules, might, upon the basis of expert knowledge and experience,
prescribe workable regulations to govern flying altitudes over the
various areas-according to the use to which the land is put-and
thus avoid the necessity, trouble and expense of litigation.67 While
courts act only after a problem arises, an expert commission could
anticipate it in advance and thus save both interests the burden
of numerous test cases.
Until the recent aviation cases, no court intimated that the
rights of a landowner were to be bounded by any concept of
"lower stratum". But, of course, a determination of "ownership"
by the criterion of "possession" would imply some degree of limitation,68 and there is abundant dicta in the early cases to the effect
that the cujus est solum maxim would not be employed without
some qualification. "9 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., and
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., each appear to have adopted
slightly varying interpretations of the zone theory1 0 These cases,
67.

It is recognized, of course, that the real difficulty will come, not in

prescribing the altitude regulations, but in the pilot's ability to identify the
various land uses and so conform his conduct to the regulations by flying
at the proper altitude above the different areas.
68. See Part V.
69. See Part IV.
70. Judge Rugg in the Smith case stated that flying at 100 feet over
woodland constituted a trespass but that flying above 500 feet, even over
the plaintiff's residence, did not constitute a trespass or create a nuisance.

Judge Hahn in rendering the opinion of the District Court in the Swetland
case, spoke of "effective possession" as fixing the extent of the plaintiffs'
exclusive property rights and indicates that under the circumstances it

should be located at 500 feet. In the Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge
Moorman divided airspace into an upper and lower stratum and inferred
that trespass would lie in the lower stratum but stated that the lower
stratum was not invaded by the flying in that case.
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and possibly the early aviation cases,"1 are authority for the zone
theory, but it is believed that there was practically no precedent
compelling these courts to adopt this theory. A few nineteenth
century legal writers suggested the zone concept 2 and at the pres78
ent time it is advocated by a considerable number of jurists.

Before finally selecting one of the above theories and suggesting the manner in which it may be used to adjust the conflicting interest of landowner and aviator, a more detailed examination
of legal precedent will be undertaken in order that the limitations
confronting such a selection may be more fully appreciated.
III.

AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT: THE MAXIM-HISTORY THEREOF.

Reference to the maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad
coelum, in English law, was first made in Bury v. Pope, decided
in the 29-30 year of Elizabeth (1586). The case involved a prescription of light and at the end of the opinion the following was
appended:
74

"NOTE. Cujus est solum, ejus est summitas usque ad coelum. Temp. Ed. I."

The note is interpreted by Hazeltine to mean that Croke, the reporter, is stating that "from Edward I's time onward, it had always
been a maxim of the English courts, ' ' 75 and Edward I reigned
71. Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith (Ct. of Quarter Sessions, Jefferson Co., Pa. 1922); Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co. (Dist. Ct.,
2d Jud. Dist. of Minn., 1923); Glatt v. Page (Dist. Ct., 3d Jud. Dist. of
Neb. 1928). These cases are discussed more fully in Part IV.
72. Pollock, Torts (13th ed.) p. 362; Burdick, Law of Torts (4th ed.)
p. 406.
73. Kuhn, see note 66, p. 127; Baldwin, "Law of the Airship-Possible
Methods and Scope of Regulation", 4 Am. Jour. Intern. L. 95, 97 (1910).;
"Aviation and Wireless Telegraphy as Respects the Maxims and Principles
of the Common Law," 71 Cent. L. Jour. 1 (1910) ; Sperl, "Legal Side of
Aviation," 23 Green Bag 398, 400 (1911) ; Paul Matter, La Revue Bleue, in
Spurt, "Let the Air Remain Free," 18 Case & Com. 119, 123 (1911);
Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law (New York, 1919) p. 55-6; Webb,
"Can I Fly over your Land?" 48 Wash. Law Rep. 673, 674 (1920) ; Trabue,
"The Law of Aviation," 9 A. B. A. Jour. 777, 789 (1923) ; Zollmann, see
note 57, pp. 22, 24; Hotchkiss, see note 66, p. 25; Jome, see note 46, p.
265; McCormick, Comment, 1 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 241 (1929); Newman,
see note 60; Strawn, "New Problems for the Lawyers," 43 U. S. Law
Rev. 389, 396 (1929) ; Bouve, "The Private Ownership of Airspace," 1 Air
Law Rev. 376, 379 (1930); Marvin, Comment, 10 Boston Univ. L. Rev.
382, 386 (1930); Annotation, 69 A. L. R. 316 (1930); Falkin, see note 46,
pp. 124-5; Wenneman, Municipal Airports (Cleveland, 1931), p. 278; Hayden,
see note 56; Fagg, "Airspace Ownership and the Right of Flight," 3 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 400 (1932).
74. 1 Cro. Eliz. 118, 78 Eng. Repr. 375.
75. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air (London: Univ. of London Press,
1911) p. 62.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

from 1272 to 1307. De Montmorency calls this the reporter's daring addition.76 The second mention of the maxim is found in
Baten's Case, 8 James (1611),17 where it is quoted parenthetically
in the middle of the opinion. The case involved a house "newly
built" which overhung the plaintiff's house. An action quod permittat was allowed, which roughly corresponds to the present action of nuisance.
Lord Coke in his Commentary upon Littleton, written about
1628, mentions the maxim, and his quotation is usually looked upon
as the source of the maxim in English law. "Land" was of predominant economic importance in Coke's time, and because it was
"the habitation of man" he calls it the "preferred" element of
the earth.78 In describing "its legall signification," Coke adds as a
final gesture:
"And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of
water, as hath been said, but of ayre a.id all other things even up to
heaven; for cuius est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, as is holden 14. H. 8.
fo. 12. 22. Hen. 6. 59. 10. E. 4. 14. Registr. origin, and in other bookes." 79

It is to be noted that, in support of the above passage, Coke makes
three references to the Year Books, and also mentions "Registi. origin., and in other bookes." None of these three cases
mentions the maxim. The earliest case, 22 Henry VI, fo. 59,
(pl. 11), involved a dispute between landlord and tenant under a
lease as to the ownership of six young goshawks roosting in the
trees on the leased land. The second case, 10 Edward IV, fo. 14,80
related to the theft of muniments of title in which the case of the
goshawks is referred to. The latest case 14 Henry VIII, fo. 12,
was an action against a tenant for waste in cutting trees, and the
question was whether the lease was from year to year and had
expired.
76. De Montmorency, "The Control of Air Spaces," 3 Transactions of
the Grotius Society 61, 66 (1918). "A careful search has failed to reveal
the maxim in the Year Books, but I think that the word summitas is some
evidence that it was a mediaeval gloss."
77. 9 Coke's Rep. 53b, 77 Repr. 810.
78. "This element of the earth is preferred before the other elements:
first and principally, because it is for the habitation and resting-place of
man; for man cannot rest in any of the other elements, neither in the
water, ayre, or fire." Coke on Littleton (London, 1629) Lib. 1, sec. 1,
p. 4a.
79. Ibid.
80. Also cited as 49 H. VI., pl. 9. This case is given both in Norman
French and in English in Year Books of Edward IV, Vol. 47 Publications
of the Selden Society (London, 1931) p. 124.

LANDOWNER AND AVIATOR

These courts apparently assumed that the owner of land had
an interest in birds that nested in trees growing on his soil, because, if he owned the land which enfolded the roots of the trees,
he owned the branches that were in the airspace above and in
which the birds had their nests. The real dispute, in the two
cases involving leases, was over the construction to be placed upon
the lease.
A case appearing in 14 Henry VIII, fo. 1 (pl. 1) discussed
the right of the Bishop of London, as landlord, to certain herons
and shovelers nesting in trees on land which the Bishop had leased,
and probably is the case Coke intended to cite in the place of
Henry VIII, fo. 12.11 In this case reference is made to "esque
al firmament" which corresponds to the Latin "usque ad coelum"
and if Coke had meant to cite it, would offer some reason for his
doing so:
. e per exception del
"Fitzh. . .
arbre, chose deins le circuit del arbre
iesque al firmament est except, e donq
. .
il ne poit medler oue ceo,
Brooke, Iustice al contrarie,
e le lessor auera le terre sur q larbre
cressoit, car larbre ad son estre per le
terre sur q il cressoit in profunditie,
e tout le aire que luy nourish in altitude, pertain a cesty a que larbre
pertaine, e touts les profits que
beignent del arbre: . .. '82

"Fitzherbert:

. . . and by the ex-

ception of the trees things within the
area of the tree and up to the sky
(firmament) are also excepted and
therefore he cannot meddle with
them. . . . Brook, J. (to the contrary) : . . . And the lessor will

have the land in which the tree
grows, for the tree has its being
through the earth and air, and therefore all the earth in which it grows
in depth, and the air it needs in
height belong to him to whom the
tree belongs, as do all the profits of
the tree.

."88

Coke's carelessness in citing the Year Books is well known.84 The
notation, "Regist. origin.", probably refers to Register of Original
81. The folio pages in the early editions of the Year Books differ
somewhat, but in reference to these citations Holdsworth said: "Coke's
references to the Year Books there cited are incorrect." 7 History of English
Law (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1926),p. 485.
82. From the folio edition printed by Richarde Tottyll, some time
before 1591.
83. Translation by E. R. James, Harvard Law School.
84. "I think there has been a growing suspicion of recent years that
Coke's knowledge of the Year Books was practically confined to what he
found in the Abridgements." Bolland, A Manual of Year Book Studies
(Cambridge Studies in English Legal History, 1925) p. 85.
"The best estimate of his importance as a legal authority is that of
C. J. Best-'The fact is that Lord Coke had no authority for what he
states, but I am afraid we should get rid of a great deal of what is considered law in Westminister Hall if what Lord Coke says without authority
is not law * * *.'" 5 Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed., 1929) p. 981.

358.
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Writs. The note in Bury v. Pope to "Temp. Ed. I" and Coke's
four citations are considerable indication that the maxim had been
used still earlier in English law. No previous mention has been
discovered in other studies. The Abridgements to the Year Books
were well known to Coke. The case in 22 Henry VI, fo. 59, is
reported in both Fitzherbert's 5 and Brooke's Abridgements, and
14 Henry VIII, fo. 1, in Brooke's Abridgement. s8 These digests
merely summarize the contents found in the Year Books and could
no more mislead Coke than could the texts of the Year Books
themselves.
The maxim is not found among the maxims collected by Sir
Francis Bacon,"7 Edmund Wingate,"8 or William Noy. 9 The
maxim is accepted in Sheppard's Touch-Stone of Common Assurances:
"By the grant of the land, or ground it selfe, all that is supra, as houses,
trees, and the like is granted, for Cujus est solum eus est usque ad coelum,
90
also all that is infra, as Mines, earth, clay, quarres, and the like."

Thomas Branch listed the maxim in his collection of "Principia
Legis et Aequitatis" published in 1753.11
Blackstone quoted the maxim with approval in his Commentaries, first published in 1766, in discussing the meaning and extent
of land in its legal significance-particularly with regard to conveyances:
"Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent, upwards
as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, is the
maxim of the law; upwards, therefore no man may erect any building, or
the like to overhang another's land

.

.

.

the word 'land' includes not

only the face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it. . ..

by

85. Fitzherbert,La Graunde Abridgement, part 2 (published by Richardi
Tottelli in 1577), title, Trespass, pl. 64, fo. 207.
86. Brooke, La Graunde Abridgement, part 2 (published by Richardi
Tottell in 1549), title, Trespass, pl. 162, fo. 286 (22 Hen. VI, 59); pl. 167,
fo. 291-2 (14 Hen. VIII, 1).
87. Bacon, "Maxims of the Law"-The Works of Francis Bacon
(Boston: Brown & Taggard, 1861), Vol. 14, p. 163-277.
88. Wingate, Maxims of Reason: or the Reason of the Common Law
of England (London, 1658).
89. Noy, The Ground and Maxims of English Laws (London, 1642, &
Middleton, Conn., 1808 from 7th London ed.).
90. Sheppard's Touch-stone of Common Assurances (London, 1648) p.
90. On the margin of this passage is cited: 14 H. 8.1., Co. Lit. 4.
91. Branch, "Principia Legis et Aequitatis" (London, 1753) p. 15. In
the 5th London edition, the maxim is translated: "The owner of the
soil is owner of every thing upon and above it, up to the clouds." (p. 32).
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the name of land, which is nomen generalissimum, every thing terrestrial
92
will pass."

In defining land, Kent made a similar use of the maxim in
his "Commentaries on American Law," first published in 1826-30,
but without employing the latin phraseology. 3 Provisions similar
to the maxim are found in the Code Napoleon, Article 552, and
numerous modern European codes.4 It has been embodied in the
statutes of several American States.05 In the last one hundred
years, the maxim has been quoted in some form or other in over
26 English and Canadian cases and in at least 80 cases arising in the
United States.
Coke, the sponsor of this maxim, held maxims generally in
the highest esteem. In discussing the principle that "inheritance
may lineally descend, but not ascend" he expresses the opinion:
"Maxime, i. e. a sure foundation or ground of art, and a conclusion of
reason, so called quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima authoritas,
atque quod maxime omnibus probetur, so sure and uncontrollable as that
they ought not to be questioned."96

The reverence which Coke manifests for legal maxims was customary among early writers,9 7 but can hardly be accepted today. A
92. Blackstone, Commentaries (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1872, Cooley's
2nd ed.), Vol. II, Ch. 2, p. 18.
93. Kent cited both Coke and Blackstone and said: "Land * * *
has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to include
everything terrestrial, under or over it." 3 Comm. (Holmes, 12th ed., 1884)_,
p. 401.
94. Lycklama a Nijeholt, Air Sovereignty (The Hague, 1910), Appendix
B, part 4.
95. Calif. Civil Code (1923), sec. 829: "The owner of land in fee has
the right to the surface and to everything permanently situated beneath or
above it." However, in California, land is defined as "the solid material
of the earth" and thus does not include airspace: Calif. Civil Code, sec.
659. See also Mont. Civil Code, (Choate 1921) sec. 6770; S. D. Comp. Laws
Ann. (1929), sec. 358; N. D. Comp. Laws Ann. (1913), sec. 5351. See also
Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372, 389.
96. Coke on Littleton, Lib. 1, sec. 3, p. l0b-lla. Reference is here
made to "P1. Coin. 27. (3. Co. 40.)."
Again in speaking of the maxim that "He which hath an estate but for
terme of life, shall neither doe homage or take homage," Coke says:
"A maxime is a proposition, to be of all men confessed and granted without
proofe, argument, or discourse. Contra negantem principia non est disputandum." Ibid, Lib. 2, sec. 90, p. 67a. The above passages are quoted
approvingly in Chrisman v. Linderman et al., 202 Mo. 605, 614, 100 S. W.
1090 (1907) ; and Felver v. Central Electric R. Co., 216 Mo. 195, 208, 115
S. W. 980 (1908).
97. "The attitude of early English commentators towards the maxims
of the law was one of unmingled adulation," 15 Encyclopedia Britannica
(14th ed.), title, Maxims, p. 117.
"At the time of Lord Coke jurists had a high opinion of maxims."
Falkin, Comment, 16 Corn. L. Quart. 119 (1930).
See also preface to Bacon's "Maxims of the Law," cit. supra note 87;
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maxim has been described as a "substitute for thought" which is
a "dangerous short cut" and "apt to operate in the same way in
law as a slogan in public affairs".98 At best, maxims only summarize a general policy which must be interpreted and applied in
the light of circumstances.9°
Blackstone, who himself repeated
the maxim and to whose credit is due its popularization in the
United States, said:
"The authority of these maxims rests entirely upon general reception
and usage: and the only method of proving, that this or that maxim is a
rule of the common law, is by shewing that it hath been always the custom
to observe it, .
. how are these maxims and customs to be known,
and by whom is their validity to be determined? The answer is, by the
judges in the several courts of-justice. . . . Judicial decisions are the
principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the
existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law."100

Maxims cannot be used to decide actual litigation and it is doubtful
if such use was ever generally attempted. 0 1
Bouvier, Law Dictionary, tit., Maxims; Vinogradoff, "Les Maximes dans
l'Ancien Droit Commun Anglais," Revue Historique de droit Francais et
Ptranger, 1923; Collected Papers (Oxford, 1928) Vol. 2, p. 239; and
M. I. Williams, "Latin Maxims in English Law," 20 Law Mag. & Rev. (4th
series, 1895).
98. McNair, "The Beginnings and the Growth of Aeronautical Law,"
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 383 (1930).
99. Apparently the Romans were under no misapprehension of the
proper use of maxims, see Paulus, in Justinian's Digest, L, 17, 1.
"Regula est, quae rem quae est
breviter enarrat. Non ex regula ius
sumatur sed ex iure quod est regula
fiat." (Mommsen's ed. of Corpus
Juris Civilis.)

A maxim (principle) is whatever
explains a thing concisely. The law
is not taken from the maxim, but the
maxim is made from what the law
is.

Lord Esher in Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647, 653, 17 E. R. C.
217, said: "I hardly need repeat -that I detest the attempt to fetter the
law by maxims. They are almost invariably misleading; they are for the
most part so large and general in their language that they always include
something which really is not intended to be included in them." See
Svendson v. Wallace Bros., 55 L. J. Q. B. 65, 66 (1885), and Blackburn,
Low and Co. v. Vigors, 55 L. J. Q. B. 347, 348 (1886). See also, Salmond,
Jurisprudence (London: Stevens &.Haynes, 3d ed. 1910), App. 3, p. 481;
Jeremiah Smith, "The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence," 9 Harv. L. Rev.
13 (1895) ; Townshend, Slander and Libel (4th ed.), sec. 88, p. 71, note 1;
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883 ed.), Vol. 2,
p. 94, note 1; E. Q. Keasbey, 3 N. J. L. Jour. 160.
100. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries, Intro., sec. 3, p. 68-9.
101. "A maxim * * * is a symbol or vehicle of the law, so far as
it goes; it is not the law itself, still less the whole of the law, even on its
own ground. One of the commonest mistakes of beginners and laymen is
to take a maxim for an authentic and complete expression of the law."
Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence (London: MacMillan & Co., 1918),
pp. 235-6.
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The latin phraseology of the maxim has varied somewhat,
but the most common form is the above-quoted, cujus est sotum
ejus est usque ad coelurn et ad inferos.10 2 The use of latin has
given rise to many misunderstandings as to the legal meaning of
the maxim. A literal translation of the phrase would read: "Whose
is the ground, his it is even to the sky and down to the depths."
Bacon stated that he expressed maxims in latin because he regarded
that languageq "as the briefest to contrive the rules compendiously". 0 8 It would seem that, in regard to this maxim, latin has
not prevented misunderstanding among modern jurists who are
not so thoroughly schooled in the classics. 0 4 One group interprets
the maxim to mean: "He who owns the land, owns up to the
sky."'10 5 Accordingly, the maxim is made the criterion of legal
ownership. Space is here accepted as capable of ownership. A
second group interprets the maxim to mean: "He who possesses
102. The following are some of the various forms the maxim has
assumed: "Cuius est solum, ejus est summitas usque ad coelum," Bury v. Pope,
see note 53; "Ab orco usque ad coelum," Penn, Coal Co. v. Mahon, 26U
U. S. 393, 419, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922); "Ad coelo usque ad centrum," Hobbs
v. Esquimalt & Nanaimo Ry. Col (Canadian) p. 231. For the citation of
this case and the following cases, see note 145; "A centro usque ad coelum,"
Central London Ry. Co. v. London Tax Com'rs. (English), p. 479; "A
centro usque ad coelum" and "Ad coelum et ad inferos," Central London
Ry. Co. v. London Tax Com'rs. (English), p. 486; "Usque ad coelum et ad
inferos," Raymond Land & Investment Co. v. Knight Sugar Co., Ltdk
(Canadian), p. 163; "Ab imo usque ad coelum," Barnett v. Johnson, p. 489;
"Cujus est solum," Corbett v. Hill (English) ; "Usque ad coelum," Hannabalson v. Sessions; "Cuius solum," Chase v. Silverstone, p. 183; Smith
Canal or Ditch Co. v. The Colorado Ice & Storage Co. See also "Qui
dominus soli dominus est coeli et inferorum," Tuttle & Bennett, "Extent
of Power of Congress over Aviation," 5 Univ. of Cinc. L. Rev. 261 (1931) ;
Colegrove, International Control of Aviation (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1930) p. 5; Henry Coiiannier, Elements Crateurs du Droit Arien
(Paris, 1929) p. 104; Basilesco, La Propriti de l'Espace Arien (Paris,
1920), p. 45-6. "Ad coelo ad centum," Stair, ii, 3, 60; Ersk., ii, 6 1;
Bell's Prin. 940--quoted in Valentine "The Air-a Realm of Law," 22
Jurid. Rev. 85, 89 (1910) ;"Ad coelo usque ad centrum" and "Inter coelu7n
et inferos," Scots L. Times 1930, p. 170; "Cuius est solum ejus est a coelo
usque ad centrum" (or "usque ad inferos"), Lord Mackenzie, Roman Law,
p. 170; Dart, Vendors and Purchasers, p. 129, from Goudy, "Two Ancient
Brocards," Essays in Legal History (Oxford Univ. Press, 1913), p. 215-30;
"A coelo usque ad centum," Traynor, Latin Phrases and Maxims (Edinburgh: Win. Paterson, 1861), pp. 1, 58.
103. The Works of Francis Bacon (Boston: Brown and Taggard,
1861), Vol. 14, p. 183.
104. Smith, "The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence," 9 Harv. L. Rev.
13 (1895).
105. Bouvier' Law Dictionary; Black's Law Dictionary; Zollmann,
Law of the Air, p. 6; Logan, Aircraft Law-Made Plain, p. 14; Haas,
"Law of the Air," 2 Marquette Law Rev. 109, 111 (1918); Wenneman,
Municipal Airports (Cleveland, 1931) p. 241.
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land, possesses also that which is above it. '' 1°6 This last interpretation does not necessarily imply that the maxim permits the same
legal remedies as are permitted where ownership is made the central idea. Possession is here made the focal point of the maxim,
but such an interpretation does not of itself imply that space is
capable of legal possession, since the scope of the maxim may be
restricted, instead, to objects in airspace. It is to be noted that
the early English authors all associated the maxim with the definition of land and when their full passages containing the maxim are
examined, it is clear that none of them committed themselves to a
theory that space per se was either owned or possessed. A third
group has contended that the maxim had nothing to do with either
ownership or possession but was a mere rule of construction to
raise a presumption as to what passed by a conveyance of "land."' 0 7
The early authors admit such an interpretation but not as exclusive.
Valentine stressed the point that several early authors had associated the maxim with the extent of the King's grant. 08 Under
feudal law the feoffee did not receive an allodial tenure of the
land but took it subject to services, some of which permitted the
overlord to pass over and upon the land granted. Some recent
authors have advanced the suggestion that if aircraft had been
known in those days the overlord would have retained the right
to fly over the land. 09 Some of these authors then concluded that
such a right must have been impliedly retained and that the modern
state has succeeded to this right and now holds it in favor of the
public.
All groups gloss over the difficulty found in the phrase usque
ad coelum-up to but not including the coelum. Literally trans106. Broom's Legal Maxims (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1924), p. 260;
Hotchkiss, Aviation Law, p. 13.
107. Spurr, "Let the Air Remain Free," 18 Case and Com. 119, 121-2
(1911).
108. "It is of some importance to observe that these writers [Craig and
Stair], other than Blackstone and Bell, make it clear that they are dealing
with the extent to be attributed to the grant made to his vassal by the
King. Their proposition comes to this, that there is nothing below heaven
that the King may give by general grant that he is not to be held to include
in his grant of lands. It will be noticed that this does not close the question,
for it remains to be determined what rights in the air may the King give."
Valentine, "The Air-A Realm of Law," 22 Jurid. Rev. 85, 90 (1910). See
Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1882), Bk. 2, Tit. 3,
sec. 60 (p. 334).
109. Valentine, see note 108. Zollmann, Law of the Air, p. 6. Hise,
"Ownership and Sovereignty of the Air or Airspace above Land-Owner's
Premises with Special Reference to Aviation," 16 Ia. Law Rev. 169, 176
(1931). Davis, "Legal Aspect of Federal Air Legislation," 11 Aviation
627 (1921).
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lated, coelum means "the sky", "heavens", or "vault of heaven",
but it also has numerous figurative uses as does our word "sky"." 0
Jome has pointed out that coelum, in the sense of sky, referred to
the region a little above "the highest tree-tops or buildings":
"Virgil refers to a 'machina aequata caelo'-a derrick equal in height
to the caelum. The machine of which he sings stood on top of a wall.
The entire distance probably did not exceed 100 feet." 1"
If this interpretation were literally adhered to, ownership or possession would extend only up to the lowest height of that region
which is probably below the space commonly used by airplanes.
However, it may well be that this use would be comparable to
our figurative use of the term "sky-scraper". There is no doubt
that this restriction found in the phrase usque ad coelum was not
consciously conceived of by Anglo-American courts until the last
decade, although their actual decisions, if not their dicta, accord
with such limitation perfectly.
Origin of the Cujus Est Solum Maxim.

In two senses, the maxim is said to be of Roman origin:
first, that the maxim was taken directly from Roman sources and,
second, that although not found in the sources it is consistent with
the principles and usages of Roman law. All attempts to trace
the exact language of the maxim to the Corpus Juris have failed.
The phraseology is now believed to have originated in a gloss or
marginal note upon several passages of Justinian's Digest which
remotely suggests the maxim. Accursius is now generally recog2
nized as the originator of the maxim and the author of this gloss."
110. See 2 Forcellini, Totius Latinitatis Lexicon (Prati: 1861), tit.,
Caelum, p. 17; Andrews, Latin-English Lexicon (New York: Harper &
Brothers) tit., Coelus, p. 295, 2nd definition: "The aerial region over the

earth, the air, sky, atmosphere, temperature, whether (very freq.)." Figura-

tive uses: "Aliquod caeli signum," constellation; "de caelo tactae," to be
struck by lightning; "albente coelo," at break of dawn; "de caelo servare,"
to observe the signs of heaven; "delabi caelo," to drop from the sky (of
a sudden good fortune) ; "caelum ac terra.u miscere," to throw everything
into confusion; "Caesar fertur in caelum," praised to the skies; "collegam
de caelo detraxisti," deprived of his position; "in caelo sum," I am in heaven,
i. e. very happy; "omnia, quae tu in caelum ferebas," extolled.
111. Jome, "Property in the Air as Affected by the Airplane and
Radio," 4 Jour. Land & Pub. Util. 257, 62 Am. L. Rev. 882 (1928).
112. This explanation of the origin of the maxim has been accepted
by: Eugene Sauze, "De l'Abus du Droit dans les Applications i la Locomotion Arienne," Revue des Idies (Aug. 15, 1910): "When we trace the
maxim back to its origin, the germ of it is found in a gloss by Accursius,
of a date corresponding more or less to the year 1200."
Henry Guibi, Essae sur la Navigation Airienne en Droit Interne et en
Droit International, (Paris, 1912).
Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law (London: MacMillan & Co.,
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He lived from about 1184 to 1263 and was one of the glossators
of the Bolognese school whose aim was to revive and popularize
Roman law. 13 He himself made many extensive glosses upon the
Digest, Code and Institutes-one author credits him with "a round
hundred thousand".114 He arranged, with his own comments, the
almost innumerable glosses, then existing, into what has become
known as the "Glossa ordinaria"."5 A few modern writers have
attributed the gloss to Cinus (Gino) of Pistoia who was of the
same school and lived between 1270 and 1366,116 and others merely
1919), p. 54; M. Guibe "found a gloss with the sign 'Acc,' in the margin of
an edition of the Digest printed in Paris in 1519, at the law Si Intercedit,
and thus tracked the famous maxim to its author, the glossator Accursius."
Bouv, "The Private Ownership of Airspace," 1 Air L. Rev. 232, 247
(1930) ; "There seems, on the whole, little doubt that the origin of the
maxim is the Accursian gloss."
113. "The critical examination of the state of the text was one of
the chief preoccupations of the Bolognese scholars. The next was literal
interpretation * * *. Their glosses could not well remain between the
lines as explanations of single words or short remarks. They naturally
spread out on the margin, where there was more room for notes, that were
not merely transliterations. With Azo and Accursius they grew to be
consecutive commentaries. * * * With the Bolognese they assumed a
more distinct character as statements of juridical rules, and were nicknamed Brocardica." Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medival Europe (2d ed.,
1929), p. 58.
114. On the life of Accursius, see a note by F. de Z., in 46 Law
Quart. Rev. 148-150 (1930); this note refers to several continental authors
who have made extensive biographical studies. See also, De Colquhoun,
A Summary of Roman Civil Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1851), pp.
167-8; and I Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed.) p. 114.
115. Carlo Calisse said: "The most famous among the Glossators is
Accursius. Whether by his merits or by his cleverness, his name came to
embody all that the school stood for. * * * This gloss, distinguished
from all others by the name 'Accursiana' or 'ordinaria', was a comprehensive
collection of all preceding glosses, summaries, and other works. * * *
It supplanted all that had gone before. The extraordinary repute of
Accursius went on increasing after his death. * * * In the courts his
gloss was as good as law; and the saying was in vogue "Quidquid non
agnoscit glossa nec agnoscit curia.' In the schools, his gloss was the
only text studied; for the other jurists, and even the books of Justinian,
were laid aside. This great work of Accursius was of course not without
its defects. He had not in all instances preserved the best nor excluded
the poorest of his predecessors' glosses. He did not always abridge correctly. * * * Yet it is hardly right to attempt to pass judgment in these
matters upon Accursius' work as we have it. For one thing, it would require
a complete acquaintance with the sources abridged by him; and most of
them either are long perished or repose still in manuscript. Moreover, in
the course of repeated copyings, so many errors have occurred, in omitting
or exchanging the signs-manual which serve to identify the passages of the
other authors and of Accursius himself, that it is now unsafe to base
conclusions upon the authorship of particular passages." I Continental Legal
History Series (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1912) p. 139-140.
116. Miraglia, Comparative Legal Philosophy (Translated 1912), sec.
292, p. 474-5: "Many invoke the authority of the Roman Law, according to which the scholastics say that the owner of the soil is the
owner of a column of air to heaven and of a column of earth to 'infernus,'
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assert that the maxim is derived from Roman sources generally, or
n7
was the product of some medieval "black letter lawyer.""
The gloss most generally referred to for the origin of the
maxim appears as a marginal note to a passage by Paulus in Justinian's Digest, VIII, 2, 1, which describes the limitations on the
acquisition of servitudes when a public way intervenes between
the dominant and servient estate because "the air ought to be
free"." 8 In the Pandectum Vetus published at Venice in 1541
"with notes by Accursius and many others, especially Antonio
Persio", appears the following gloss upon the above passage:
"Cujus est solum, ejus debet esse
usque ad coelum, ut hic, & infra
'Quod vi aut clam'. 1 fi. §. pen."119

Whose is the soil, his it ought to

be up to the sky; as here & below
see XLIII, 24, 22, 4.

While the name Accursius is not appended to this gloss, it is found
but such statements are a hyperbole invented by Gino da Pistoia and have
no foundation in the sources of Roman law, which teaches different limitations of the property right in regard to what is above and below the soil."
See also Brissaud, History of French Private Law (Tr. 1912), p. 283. Ball
accepts the explanation of Brissaud and Miraglia. Stuart Ball, "Jural Nature
of Land," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 49 (1928).
117. Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, p. 58. "This doctrine is based
upon the ancient maxim derived from the Roman system of law that whoever
owns the land owns all below the surface and all above."
Baldwin, "The Law of the Airship," 4 Am. 3. Int. L. 97 (1910).
"This maxim was not derived from the nation whose language is used
for its statement and, as we have seen, is foreign to the conceptions
of the Roman Law as to what is the common property of all. It is the
production of some black-letter lawyer, and, like every short definition of
a complex right, must be taken with limitations."
See also: Goudy, "Two Ancient Brocards," Essays in Legal History,
p. 230; Sir H. Erie Richards, "Sovereignty over the Air" (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1912), p. 11; Kuhn, "The Beginnings of an Aerial Law," 4 Am.
J. Int. L. 123 (1910).; De Montmorency, "The Control of Air Space,"
3 Trans, of Grotius Society (1917), p. 66; MacCracken, "Air Law,"
57 Am. L. Rev. 97 (1923); Wenneman, Municipal Airports, p. 241.

118. "Si intercedat solum publicum
vel via publica, neque itineris acusve
neque altius tollendi servitutes impedit: sed immitendi protegendi prohibendi, item fluminum et stillicidiorum servitutem impedit, quia caelum, quod supra id solum intercedit,
liberum esse debet. (From Mommsens ed. of 1911).

"If public ground or a public road
comes in the way, this does not
hinder the servitude of a via or an
actus or a right to raise the height of
a building, but it hinders a right to
insert a beam, or to have an overhanging roof or other projecting
structure, also one to the discharge
of a flow or drip of rain-water, because the sky over the ground referred to ought to be unobscured."
(Monro's Translation of the Digest
[Cambridge: University Press, 1909]
Vol. 2, p. 68.)

119. The abbreviations found in the above edition have been expanded.
In some editions this passage is found at VIII, 1, 21.
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at the end of the last note on the above page. Similar glosses
are found in subsequent editions of the Digest.1 20 The crossreference refers to a pasage in the Digest concerning the keeping
of burial-lots free from over-hanging trees.121 In the 1541 edition of the Digest, above mentioned, the gloss appended to this
section consists merely of a reference back to the above-quoted
passage.12 2 Several other passages from the Digest remotely suggest the maxim. 2 3
In the Code of Justinian, III, 34, 8, is a passage stating that
a proprietor is free to build upon his land when not under a servitude. 1 24 In an edition of the Code, printed at Nuremberg in 1488,
by Koberger, appears the following gloss:
120. Leyden: Hugonem a Porta, 1549, 1552, 1557; Amsterdam, 1548,
1563.
121. Quod Vi Aut Clam, (XLIII, 24, 22, 4).
"Si quis projectum aut stillicidium
in sepulchrum immiserit, etiamsi ipsum monumentum non tangeret,
recte cum eo agi, quod in sepulchro
vi aut clam factum sit, quia sepulchri,
sit non solum is locus, qui recipiat

If anyone causes a projection to
hang over, or water from a roof to
drop upon a burial place, even though
it does not touch the tomb itself,
there is a rightful claim against him
because an injury was done to the

humationem, sed omne etiam supra

tomb "vi aut clam," since that is not

id caelum: eoque nomine etiam
sepulchri violati agi posse." (From
Mommsen's ed. of 1911)

only the place of the tomb which receives the interment, but also all the
sky above it: and on this ground an
action is possible against him for
violating a tomb.
122. Similar glosses are found in the following editions: Leyden:
Antonium Vincentium, 1512, Hugonem a Porta, 1550; Venetiis, 1591; Leydon:
Hugonem a Porta, 1569, 1602. In some editions this passage is found at
XLIII, 23, 21, 4.
123. Digest VIII, 2, 9 Ulpian:

"Cum eo, qui tollendo obscurat
vicini aedes, quibus non serviat, nulia
competit actio." (From Moinmsen's
ed. 1911)

"Where a man by raising the
height of his own house cuts off the
flow of light to that of his neighbour,
but is not subject to a servitude in
respect of the latter, there is no
right of action against him." (Monro's trans., p. 70)

Upon this passage the following gloss is found in the 1541 edition:
"Si habeo domum, possum eam exIf I own a house, I can raise it
altare usque ad coelum, si non debeo
even to the sky, if I owe no servitude to anyone.
alii servitutem. Viuia."
124. "Altius quidem aedificia, tollere, si domus servitutem non debeat,
dominus eius minime proibetur."
(From Mommsen's ed. of 1911)

One is in no wise prevented from
constructing his building higher provided his building acknowledges no
servitude.
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"Videtur ergo quod quodlibet praedium praesumitur liberum nisi probetur contrarium est enim cuiuslibet
usus usque ad celum
."125

It was adjudged, therefore, that
every property is presumed free unless there is a contrary restriction,
for everyone's enjoyment extends to
the sky above.

Similar glosses appear in subsequent editions of the Code. 120
No other passages from the Corpus Juris Civilis have been found
or referred to which employ language suggesting the maxim cujus
est solum. It is to be noted that all of the above passages refer
to public or sacred land and that rights in such land do not need
to be the same as those over private land. 27 From the above
sources, it is clear that there is nothing in the original Roman
texts which directly supports the maxim. It would seem even to
be doubtful whether the gloss attributed to Accursius directly supports the maxim because of the word debet-ought to be-and not
habet.
Much consideration has been given to the question as to
whether the maxim is consistent with the spirit of Roman law,
although not literally found therein, and upon this question modern
legal writers are divided.'2 s The air (aer) was considered res
communis in Roman law in the same manner as the sea and the
seashore. Many passages from the Corpus Juris are cited to
125. The abbreviations found in the above edition have been expanded,
following Capelli's Dizionario di Abbreviature Latine ed Italiane (Milan,

1912).
126.

Amsterdam, 1663.

Two variations of this gloss have been found

in the following editions:
"Videtur ergo, quod quodlibet praedium praesumitur liberum nisi
probetur contrarium est enim cuiuslibet solum usque ad celum." Leyden,
Antonio Vincentio, 1512.
"Videtur ergo, quod quodlibet praedium praesumitur libcrum, nisi
probetur contrarium est enim eius usque ad coelum, cuius est solum." Leyden,

1553, 1569, 1591; Paris, 1566.
127. "Both these passages refer to the space above land that is not
private property, but they appear to lay down with respect to public or
sacred lands the general principle as stated by Dr. Roby (Roman Private
Law, Vol. 1, p. 414)." De Montmorency, "The Control of Air Spaces," 3
Trans. Grotius Soc. (1918), p. 61-65.
"Whatever belonged to the Roman people lay outside the pale of
private law." Sohm's Institutes of Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1907), p. 303. See also Sandars, Justinian (Chicago: Callaghan & Co.,
1876), p. 160, Inst. II, 1, 8 & 9.
"It was only from the point of view of vicinage and servitude that
the Romans had occasion to consider the coelum in this sense and it was the
same with the mediaevalists." Goudy, "Two Ancient Brocards," Essays in
Legal History, Chap. 11, p. 215, 231.
128. "Our present brocard, though it appears nowhere in the Roman
texts, is consistent with the Roman law, and would not have sounded
strange to the classical jurisconsults." Goudy, "Two Ancient Brocards,"
Essays in Legal History, p. 230.

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

show this. 29 Today we distinguish, air, a floating element, from
airspace, the geometric concept, and recognize that the element air
is like the sea. Any part of the air may be appropriated by and
as long as it is enclosed, but otherwise it is res communis.1 0 No
direct evidence has been shown that the Romans made this distinction between air and airspace, and opinions differ as to whether
the Romans intended to include airspace as well as air in referring
to the air as res communis.18' For airspace, the Romans had the
129. Paulus in Justinian's Institutes, II, 1, 1:
* * naturali iure communia sunt
"The following things are by natomnium haec: aer et aqua profluens
ural law common to all: the air,
*

et mare * * *"

running water, the sea."

Marcianus in Digest I, 8, 2, 1:
"*

* * naturali iure omnium corn-

"* *

By natural law, the follow-

munia sunt illa: aer, aqua profluens,

ing things are common to all: air,

et mare * * *"

flowing water, the sea."

Celsus in Digest, XLIII, 8, 3, 1:
"*
* Maris communem usum omnibus hominibus, ut aeris * * *"

"* * The use of the sea is common to all, and that of the air."

Ulpian in Digest, XLVII, 10, 13, 7:
"*

* et * * mare commune om-

nium est et litora, sicuti aer *

"The sea and the seashore is com-

mon to all, as is also the air." From
Lardone, "Airspace Rights in Roman
Law," 2 Air L. Rev. 455, 461 (1931).
See Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglae, Bk. I, Ch. XII
(leaf 7b) 5, p. 56-7 (f8):
"Naturali vero iure communia sunt
By natural law certainly all these
omnium haec: aqua profluens, aer things are common: flowing water,
et mare et litora mars, quasi mari
air and sea, and the shores of the
accessoria. Nemoigitur ad iitus mars sea, as being as it were approaches to
accedere prohibetur, dum tamen villis the sea. For no one is prohibited
et aedificiis abstineat, quia, litora non from approaching to the sea shore
sunt iure gentium communia sicut et provided he abstains from the villas
mare." Bracton and Azo, Vol. 8, and buildings, for the shores are not
Selden Society Publications (Lon- by the right of nations common,
don, 1895).
such as the sea.
Prof. Maitland in the above book comments on the "strange blunder"
that Bracton made in taking this text from Azo's Summa, "the introduction
of litora as a subject for noi: suni makes nonsense of the whole passage.
* * * He has just said that the litora marls are naturali iure communia
omnium. He now says litora non sunt de jure gentium communia." (p. 93).
30. "The stars and the clouds, the open sea, as well as flowing water
and the great currents of air, are not in themselves subject to private
ownership. They are viewed as res communes omnium, and as open to the
general use of mankind. Nevertheless, parts or portions of such objects of
nature can be the object of proprietary right, if they are severed and
brought within the actual control of man, as, for instance, water and air
confined within proper receptacles." Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, pp.
54-5. See also Marcianus in Digest I, 8, 6, concerning a building on the
sea shore.
131. "Weighing against the maxim is the old and well-known statement
by common-law writers that there are certain properties which no man
*"
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expression "aeris spatium" and the word "spatium".12 The following passage from Ulpian in the Digest, XLIII, 27, 1, 8 & 9,
outlining the right to cut back trees overhanging city and farm
property is thought to be significant:
"Quod ait praetor, et lex duodecim
tabularum efficere voluit, ut quindecim pedes altius rami arboris circumcidantur: et hoc idcirco effectum
est, ne umbra arboris vicino praedio
noceret.
"Differentia duorum capitum interdicti haec est: si quidem arbor
aedibus impendeat, succidi, earn praecipitur, si vero agro impendeat, tantum usque ad quindecim pedes a
terra coerceri."' s s

The praetor also says this, and the
law of the twelve tables is to the
same effect, that tree branches are
to be cut back up to 15 feet and this
is to be carried out lest the shade of
the trees harm the neighboring farm.
The difference between the two
headings of the interdict is this; if
any tree overhangs a building, it is
prescribed that it be cut down, but if
it overhangs a field, that it merely be
trimmed to a height of fifteen feet
from the ground.

may own, among them the air and the high seas. It is only fair to say
that these early writers, no more than Coke himself, had in mind air space.
They were probably referring to the element of air. But air space, now that
it has become navigable, at least is clearly analogous to the navigable seas;
just as the navigable seas belong to all nations and all men, so does the
navigable air space." Logan, "Aviation and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum,"
16 St. Louis Law Rev. 303, 309 (1931). A similar opinion was advanced in
the brief filed by Mrs. Mable Walker Willebrandt in the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 6th Circuit, in Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., p. 25, 29.
Professors Goudy and Lardone are of the opinion that the Romans did
not hold that airspace was res communis. "The assertion of some recent
writers that because the air, like the sea, is res communis and free to all,
the circulation of air-craft would not have been prevented by Roman Law,
is, to my mind, based on an erroneous assumption. It is assumed that aer
and coelum mean the same thing. But though no formal distinction was
made between them by the Roman jurists, and though the terms are sometimes used as equivalents, a distinction none the less existed. It was the
aer-the omnipresent medium never at rest and incapable of appropriationthat was res comnunis. It was so because necessary for the life and health
of all. But in contrast with it the coelum was res soli and capable more
or less of appropriation by the owner of the soil. In this sense it was not
so much aer as spatium (or regio) aeris and it is only in this sense that
it can be understood in the two passages above cited. The common user
of aer is indeed asserted by many passages in the Digest, but private ownership of the coelum is also asserted. There is no inconsistency." Goudy,
"Two Ancient Brocards," Essays in Legal History, pp. 231-2. See Lardone,
"Airspace Rights in Roman Law," 2 Air L. Rev. 455, 461 (1931).
132. The former is found in the Code, VIII, 10, 11, Pr. and the latter

in Digest VIII, 2, 14. "Coelum" is found in Digest, VII, 1, 13, 6; VIII 2,
1, Pr.: VIII, 2, 28; XLIII, 24, 21, 2; XLIII, 24, 22, 4. "The word 'air' in
the sense of 'airspace' has been found but once: "Ex eo quo avibus ex aere
cecidisset * * * (Something which fell from the bird through the air).'
[Dig. XVIII, 1, 40, 3] First, however, it should be noted that this
is a case of doubtful writing in the manuscripts. Some manuscripts instead
of 'ex aere (from the air)' have 'ex ore (from the the mouth of the bird).'"
Lardone, "Airspace Rights in Roman Law," p. 461.
133. From Mommsen's ed. of 1911, p. 751-2.
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From the above passage, principally, de Montmorency draws the
conclusion that:
"An owner received from the State such a height of airspace as enabled
him to make use of his land: Fifteen feet in the case of agricultural or
garden, land, and such height as he originally selected in the case of a
building. That height became for his neighbors the vertical measure of
the proprietary right that the householder possessed, and henceforward
anything else that he got he got by way of servitude. * * * Anything in
the nature of air space other than the air space contained, as above, in the
original grant from the State, remained the property of the State in
1 4
Roman Law." '

Lardone has reached a contrary conclusion:
"This text does not take away the right of ownership of the air column
above fifteen feet. It simply states that such occupation of the non-owner
causes no damage; and so must not be disturbed, but on the contrary
tolerated. In other words, this is but another example of the fair use of
property required by the Justinian Law. * * * The conclusion can be
briefly summarized: Roman Law accepts private control of airspace above
private property, because it considers it inherent in the ownership of the
land itself; and does not limit such control to low altitudes."'1 5

Plausibility is lent to the assertion that it was through Accursius that the maxim was introduced into English law because
he had a son, Franciscus, who spent several years in England.
134. Do Montmorency, "The Control of Air Spaces," 3 Trans. of
Grotius Soc. (1918) p. 61, 64.
"The air, the sea, and the water of rivers have been said to be for the
common use of all men, but to belong to none. This statement is, however,
so far at any rate as it relates to air, by no means incontrovertible. The
passage in the Digest to the effect that "naturaliiure sunt omnium communia ilia: aer, et aqua profluens, et mare, et per hoc litora marls' (Dig. I,
8, 2), must be compared with other passages, which seem to connect spaces
of air with the subjacent land, so suggesting the old maxim of English
law."-Citing Dig. VIII, 2, 1, pr., XLIII, 24, 22, 4. In reference to the
above-quoted passage from the Digest, Holland says that "Puchta would
apply these words to air rather than to the space occupied by it. Inst. II,
p. 525, n. Cf. Ovid, Metam. I, 135, VI 349." Holland, Jurisprudence (Oxford
Univ. Press, 1917), p. 190.
"The Roman traditions of ownership in the aerial space was rcvived in
the later Middle Ages and came down to Blackstone through Coke upon
Littleton".-Citing Julliot, De la Propriete du Domaine Aerien, p. 7; Hershey,
Essentials of International Public Law (New York: Macmillan Co., 1921
p. 233. See also Hazeltine, The Law of the Air, quoted in note 117.
135. Lardone, "Airspace Rights in Roman Law," 2 Air L. Rev., p. 467.
"Neither the Romans nor the mediaevalists had to consider the important questions of overhead rights that we moderns have to consider.
* * * I venture to think that the right of property in the coelum would
have sufficed to prevent air-transit over a man's ground and interdicts to
prevent it would have been granted had damage been caused or threatened."
Goudy, "Two Ancient Brocards," Essays in Legal History (1913), p. 231.
See also Baldwin, "The Law of the Air-Ship," 4 Am. J. Int. L. 95 (1910).
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Franciscus Accursius lived from 1225 to 1298 and was himself an
eminent legal scholar. It is said that Edward I of England, on his
return from the Holy Land in 1272, passed through Bologna and
arranged to have Franciscus Accursius accompany him to England
and become among other things, a lecturer at Oxford. 88 It is to
be noted that it was to Edward I's time that reference was made
in the case of Bury v. Pope.
It has recently been pointed out in a law note that the
maxim was familiar in principle to early Jewish conveyancing law
and that the maxim may have been introduced "into English law
through Jewish influence and usage".'8
The author of this note
suggested that the Jewish use of the phrase more closely
paralleled the English use of the maxim than the Roman,18 and
ventured to say that "the Jews were more likely to influence English law" in the 12th and 13th centuries because "they were constantly in touch with it through the Exchequer and were accustomed
in their fines to employ their own customs and phraseology."' 89
Hebrew conveyancers used two phrases to indicate the vertical
extent of land ownership, "depth and height" and "from the abyss
below to the sky above".1 4 0 As Palestine was a very dry land,
these phrases were of particular importance in determining whether
wells and cisterns passed by a conveyance. The Mishna, or ancient
law, is not explicit, and the commentators in the Gamara disagreed
on what was included by their use."' Apparently, when a sale
of a house mentioned only the "depth and the height", neither a
roof more than ten hands high nor a dug cistern passed, but they
136. "His (Accursius') eldest son, Franciscus (1225-03), who also
filled the chair of law at Bologna, was invited to Oxford by King Edward
I., and in 1275 or 1276 lectured on law in the university:" 1 Encyclopedia
Britannica. See also De Colquhoun, A Summary of Roman Civil Law, Vol.
I, p. 168.
137. See note by F. A. L., 47 Law Quart. Rev. 14 (1931).
138. The Romans were concerned with praedial servitudes. For a
discussion of servitudes, see: Sandars, Institutes of Justinian, p. 187 et seq.;
Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law (Cambridge: Univ. Press,
1925) Chap. VII, p. 153; Declareuil, Rome the Law-Giver (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1926) p. 182 et seq.
139. 47 Law Quart. Rev. 14 at p. 16.
140. The Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. X, tit. Sale, p. 648: "He who sells
a house ('bayit') does not sell the separate wainscot walls, nor a moveable
interior closet, nor a roof with a railing more than ten hands in height,
nor a diig cistern, nor a walled cistern. In order to include these, the
words 'from the abyss below to the sky above' are necessary, 'depth and
height' not being sufficient."
141. Babylonian Talmud, Baba Bathra, 64A (Mishna IV, 2) (New
York: New Talmud Publg. Co., 1902) Vol. V (XIII), p. 146.
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did pass if the phrase "from the abyss below to the sky above"
was used. 142 The Jews clearly conveyed land in horizontal strata
but there is nothing in this usage to indicate that ownership could
not be had in the upper airspace if the appropriate conveyance was
drawn. However, it has been said that the latin maxim cujus est
solum was not applied in Jewish law to the sale of houses:
"It was so usual for the ownership of houses to be divided (mostly
among coheirs), one son owning the rooms on the ground floor and
another the upper story, that the maximum of the Roman law 4'cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelurn' was not applied to buildings."' 3

The origin of the maxim is still shrouded in considerable obscurity, but at the present time the Accursian gloss appears to be
the most reasonable explanation of its origin, even if in principle
it may have been familiar to classical Roman jurists, though not
put into their written laws. Whether it originated in Roman law
or as a mediaeval gloss, the maxim grew up at a time when air
142. Rabbi Dimi of Nahardea said: "If one sells a house with the
intention of giving title to all its contents, although the bill of sale states
from the bottom to the top, title is not acquired in wells, etc. (if such there
were), unless he writes: 'You shall acquire title from the depth of the
earth to the height of the sky.' And it is not sufficient to state: 'From the
depth to the height of this house is sold to you'; and the reason is because
the last expression gives title only to that which is beneath the house, like
a cellar, basement. etc., and also to the roof and the attic, but it does not
suffice for the well and its stone walls, which are not included in the same.
However, the expression, 'from the depth of the earth to the height of the
sky,' includes them also, and other caves which may be found beneath the
house, and also above the roof, if there is an attic that measures more than
ten spans in height and width:" Gamara; Baba Bathra, Ch. 4, p. 1; Vol.
supra, p. 153.
Rabbi Akiba apparently contended that all rights in a well passed by
a conveyance from the depths to the heights: "Title is not given to a
well, or to the stone wall thereof (if this wa3 not plainly mentioned in
the bill of sale of the house), although there is mentioned that he sold
him the depth and the height; however, the seller must buy a way to the
well from the new owner of the house. So is the decree of R. Aquiba.
The sages, however, maintain that it is not necessary:" Mishna, Baba
Bathra, Ch. 4, p. 2; Vol. supra, p. 154. Accord, Le Talmud de Jerusalem,
Baba Bathra, IV, 1 & 2 (Paris 1888) p. 184. However, the Jewish Encyclopedia, supra, states: "According to the prevailing opinion of R. Akiba,
the purchaser, if the cistern is included, has the exclusive right of way to

it * * *."
143. The Jewish Encyclopedia, supra, p. 647-8. To support the position

that the English usage of the maxim was a familiar principle of Jewish
law, the author of the note in 47 L. Quart. Rev. cites the following as

possible references: Isaiah, VII, ii, and Deuteronomy, XXX, 11-14, which
do not appear to be in point. The phrase is stated to appear in a Starr or
Jewish contract dated 1285, made between Rabbi Ursell of Norwich and
Gilam the Norman (No. 1199 British Museum), and also in "Cologne Starra
(contemporary with No. 1199) in the Judenschreinsbuch, p. 64, No. 181,
and in a number of Barcelona Starrs of earlier date reproduced in Gulak's
collection."

LANDOWNER AND AVIATOR

transportation was practically undreamed of. Flying, except by
birds, was purely legendary. The world was still thought to be
flat. Heaven was an actual location a short distance above the
surface, and Hades a still more definite place underneath. The
Eiffel Tower and the Empire State Building had not been conceived of. The use to which land was put, or could be put, was
relatively limited to the space near the surface. Not until 1782
was the first balloon ascent made.
Undoubtedly, the maxim was invoked by Coke and the judges
who employed it tq protect the uses then being made of land. At
that time, invasion of the airspace could only be effected by a
projection from a neighbor's land or by throwing or shooting
something over or onto the land, and until very recently no object
could be shot very high into the air. Few of these encroachments
were noisy, some were dangerous (shooting), and others might
develop into easements. Their treatment was peculiar to their
nature, and distinguishable from invasions by airplanes. In the
words of Dr. McNair, the maxim seems to have "slipped almost
inadvertently into the English common law",' 4 in a form susceptible
of interpretation which extends far beyond the application intended
by Coke and Blackstone and the judges who gave homage to it.
(To be continued)
1

144. McNair, "The Beginnings and the Growth of Aeronautical Law,"
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